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2. The Induction of Emotion: Situational Fear of Crime  
In this section I will focus on the hypothesis that the age-related increase in precautious 
behavior is an expression of an increase in dispositional fear, i.e., the tendency to 
experience situational fear of crime and that this increase is related to age-related changes 
in subjective (physical) vulnerability. To do so, I will first give a brief overview of 
theories about and empirical findings concerning emotional development over the life 
course with specific focus on the development of fear. Then I will consider age-related 
changes in health and how they relate to vulnerability and fear. Ensuing, I will 
contemplate implications of these considerations for the microgenesis and ontogenesis of 
fear of crime and deduce hypotheses. These hypotheses will be tested with a vignette 
technique in three studies. Details of each study pertaining to hypotheses, methods, and 
discussion will be considered directly with regard to the presentation of each study 
followed up by a general discussion. 
 
2.1. Developmental Theories of Emotion 
A developmental perspective on emotions entails questioning in what regard emotions are 
supposed to develop. Developmental changes could occur pertaining to the processes that 
constitute an emotion. There could be, e.g., differences in the way appraisal processes or 
physiological processes take place or what is subjectively experienced as an emotion. 
Changes could also refer to the conditions that evoke emotions, i.e., intra-individual 
change in relevance of events with regard to goals, beliefs etc. and environments that 
evoke an emotion. Accordingly, the question would follow why there are changes in 
relevance (e.g., because bodily functions have changed; time to live decreases, although 
in comparison with prior cohorts it increased) and situations (either sought out by the 
person themselves or age-related changes of situations, e.g., because of retirement, 
differences in interacting with old adults). In relation, changes might occur with regard to 
the wish of experiencing emotions themselves, hence, influencing emotion regulation and 
changes with regard to the expression of emotion. It is difficult to disentangle these 
various potential changes and their interrelations, especially within one study. This is 
probably why most of the studies focus only on one or some aspects of potential change. 
 
2.1.1. Theoretical Approaches and Their Implications for Fear 
Several theories have been advanced regarding emotional development across the life 
span, among them optimization and selectivity theories (cf. Blanchard-Fields, 2007; 
Carstensen, 1992; Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003; Lawton, 2001; Scheibe & 
Carstensen, 2010), dynamic integration theory (Labouvie-Vief, 2003, Labouvie-Vief, 
2008), and differential-emotions theory (Izard & Ackerman, 1998; Magai, 2008; Magai, 
Consedine, Krivoshekova, Kudadjie-Gyamfi, & McPherson, 2006). Some theories pertain 
to an evolutionary perspective on discrete emotions, while others do not elaborate in 
much detail about the underlying emotional concept or only refer to distinctions between 
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positive and negative affect. Fear and especially different objects of fear have seldom 
been the focus of emotion developmental studies. I will first outline two variations of 
differential-emotions theory as a theory that distinguishes between discrete emotions. 
Then I will sketch the assumptions of socioemotional selectivity theory that is oftentimes 
referred to as theoretical scheme to explain the seemingly paradoxical finding of high 
emotional well-being in old age (which is relevant for the subsequent paragraph regarding 
studies of emotional experience). Additionally, I will refer studies that qualify the general 
finding.  
 
Differential-Emotions Theory  
Differential-emotions theory centers on the qualitatively different nature of the primary or 
basic emotions (e.g., joy, anger, fear, guilt) that are assumed to have discriminable 
patterns of motivational, expressive, and phenomenological aspects. Magai (2008) and 
Levenson (1999) see emotions as hard-wired relations between different components of 
emotion. Due to emotion’s continued functionality across lifetime these relations are not 
assumed to be subject to age-related change. Yet, the function of, for example, the heart 
also remains the same but this does not prevent it from losing its capacities under some 
circumstances and thereby influences also its relations with other components of the body 
(for age-related overviews, e.g., Cacioppo, Berntson, Klein, & Poehlmann, 1998; Charles, 
2010). Moreover, the relative importance of some functions may change and with this 
potentially also underlying relations between the components of emotion (e.g., children’s 
overestimation of their skills (i.e., reduced meta-cognitive abilities) encourages 
exploration of new territories, cf. Bjorklund, 1997; the frequency of anger may reflect 
greater assimilative resources in young adults than in old adults, cf. U. Kunzmann, 
personal communication, September 25, 2012).  
In contrast, Magai (2008) postulates changes concerning the “linkages with the cognitive 
and behavioral subsystems, which lead to elaboration and complexity” (p. 377). 
Accordingly, experience-based knowledge about the circumstances of the occurrence of 
own and other people’s emotion is expected to increase resulting in more complex 
emotional experience. In the same vein, Levenson (1999) assumes that the control system 
(appraisal processes in contrast to the core system consisting of different components) 
influences the conditions that activate the core system and thereby manipulates the 
probability of emotion occurrence. Moreover, it affects the way response tendencies are 
acted on and thereby increases or decreases the probability of specific responses. 
Regarding group differences, Levenson (1999) suggests possible differences in the core 
system as well as in the control system. Differences in the core system could consist in 
“the required intensity and closeness to prototype required for events to match the 
prototypical situations that elicit different emotions” (p. 499). Moreover, there could be 
differences in the strength of the hard-wired connections to the response tendencies. 
Differences in the control system refer to constant learning of how to appraise events, 
what to feel (appropriate for the in-group), and how to display emotions.  
However, it is difficult to differentiate between changes in the one or the other system. 
How would it be possible to distinguish differences in required intensity to match the 
prototypical situation as difference in the core system (and how do they develop?) from 
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differences in appraisal processes of an event? Levenson gives as example for the core 
system that “group A might require more intense threats that are closer to the idealized 
prototype to elicit fear than group B” (p. 499). In contrast concerning the control 
mechanism, group B may have learned to appraise the situation differently than group A. 
One and the same situation would result in differences in fear between the two groups due 
to two (seemingly) different causes. Besides questionable evidence for hard-wiredness of 
emotions (see chapter 1.2.1), what is the difference between the two options for change? 
From an appraisal perspective as outlined in chapter 1.2.1 it seems that both changes 
concern differences in appraisal processes that take into account situational phenomena 
and the internal state (regarding physical constitution and current and future goals). 
However, differences in appraisal processes could, for example, stem from internalized 
stereotypes about how old adults should interpret the situation, how they want to interpret 
the situation (in the sense of emotion regulation goals, including unconscious processes), 
or how they must interpret the situation (given specific goals such as self-protection and 
changed evaluation of vulnerability).  
 
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory 
The socioemotional selectivity theory (SST) mainly focuses on emotion regulatory goals 
as explanation for age differences in positive and negative affect (discrete emotions are 
seldom studied; Carstensen et al., 2003; Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010). According to SST 
old adults prioritize emotional goals over information seeking goals in contrast to young 
adults. This change in goal priorities is a consequence of motivational changes first 
studied with regard to social relations (Carstensen, 1992). Three aspects contribute to this 
change: (1) lifetime accrual of experience and knowledge (similar to Magai, 2008), (2) 
realization of physical aging, and (3) sense of expiring lifetime. The theory’s origin is 
based on studies regarding the age-related increase in elective selection of interaction 
partners so as to invest in emotionally gratifying relationships rather than disengaging 
from the social world and preparing for one’s death as disengagement theory would have 
it (Cumming & Henry as cited in Carstensen, 1992). The SST has been extended from its 
application in the realm of social relationships to emotion regulatory processes in 
information processing in general (attention: Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 
2009; Mather & Carstensen, 2003; memory: Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; 
Kensinger, 2008; decision making: Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007). The studies show 
that old adults tend to produce a positivity bias, i.e., “motivated cognition operating in the 
service of emotion regulation. When high priority goals concern well-being, people adap-
tively focus relatively more on positive than negative information” (Scheibe 
& Carstensen, 2010, p. 137).  
However, qualifications regarding the ubiquity of the phenomenon have been made. 
Kensinger (2008) demonstrated that the positivity effect in memory only occurs with 
nonarousing stimuli, while there is no age difference with high arousing stimuli. Old 
adults showed an advantage of remembering positive nonarousing words over negative 
nonarousing words in comparison with young adults. Kensinger (2008) interprets this as 
expressing differences between automatic information processing of high arousing stimuli 
that cannot be influenced by emotional goals as easily as the processing of nonarousing 
valenced stimuli. In the same vein, Mather and Knight (2006) and Hahn, Carlson, Singer, 
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and Gronlund (2006) showed by employing a visual search task that old adults’ difference 
between detecting angry faces compared with happy (and sad) faces as discrepant face 
among otherwise neutral faces was equal to the difference in young adults; both age 
groups detected angry faces faster. In contrast, old adults were better in disengaging 
attention from angry faces compared with young adults (Hahn et al., 2006). The authors 
interpret this as showing that threat detection as a function of emotion is still intact. 
Moreover, depletion of cognitive resources such as working memory undermines 
processes behind the evocation of the positivity effect (Knight et al., 2007; Mather & 
Knight, 2005). Although the theory posits that positivity effects occur in service of 
emotion regulation, this is seldom directly demonstrated (see Isaacowitz & Blanchard-
Fields, 2012, for a critical review). Socioemotional selectivity theory makes no direct 
assumptions about developmental changes in discrete emotions, but given the authors’ 
interpretation of studies with threat stimuli, it seems that emotion regulation goals in a 
given fear eliciting situation do not apply.  
 
2.1.2. Methodological Approaches to Measure Emotion Experience 
Frequency Studies and Experience Sampling 
In general, studies of age-related changes in positive and negative affect have been 
conducted more often than studies regarding discrete emotions; this specifically pertains 
to frequency studies of emotional experience. When discrete emotions have been 
addressed in empirical studies, they seldom included fear. Frequency studies of positive 
and negative affect show a decrease of negative affect from early adulthood to midlife in 
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies and stability beginning from about 60 years (e.g., 
Carstensen et al., 2000; Carstensen et al., 2011; Charles et al., 2001; Kunzmann, 2008; 
Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). A study of Grühn et al. (2010) shows slightly different results 
with middle-aged adults indicating more frequent negative affect in the last year than 
young and old adults. An experience-sampling study yielded an age-related decrease in 
mean intensity of negative affect (Riediger, Schmiedek, Wagner, & Lindenberger, 2009). 
Studies specifically referring to frequency of fear indicate either stability (Gross et al., 
1997; Scherer et al., 2004) or decrease with age (Grühn et al., 2010; worry: Basevitz, 
Pushkar, Chaikelson, Conway, & Dalton, 2008; Stone, Schwartz, Broderick, & Deaton, 
2010). Thus, these findings are in line with frequency studies of the subjective experience 
of fear of crime. 
Yet, frequency studies alone do not tell us why there are differences or stability. Similarly 
to the measurement of fear of crime with frequency measures about subjective experience 
of fear, frequency measures of positive and negative affect or discrete emotions may be 
subject to all kinds of influences. Some researchers have advanced this problem by 
including covariates to uncover their influence on the frequency of affects. For example, 
subjective and objective health indicators were included in some studies. Kunzmann, 
Little, and Smith (2000) found that functional health (vision, hearing, and mobility) 
influences the frequency of negative affect. When controlling for functional health, the 
nonsignificant relationship between age and negative affect transformed into a negative 
relationship indicating an age-related decrease in negative affect in an old population (70-
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103 years). Accordingly, bad functional health suppresses other age-related effects on 
negative affect. In contrast, cognitive abilities (speed, memory, knowledge, and fluency) 
had no influence on negative affect (Kunzmann, 2008), while controlling for self-rated 
mental fitness also resulted in a negative relationship between age and negative affect in 
the same sample. However, other studies with a wider age range show that the age effect 
on negative affect remains intact even after inclusion of health variables (e.g., Carstensen 
et al., 2000, 2011; Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). On the other hand, Carstensen et al. (2000) 
recruited explicitly a sample with relatively healthy old adults (18-94 years) and the age 
range (25-74 years) of Mroczek and Kolarz’s (1998) study is not comparable to that of 
Kunzmann et al. (2000). Accordingly, the influence of health needs to be further 
addressed. Other studies have included sociodemographic variables and personality 
variables such as neuroticism and extraversion, which are partly related to negative affect 
and fear but do not weaken the age effect (e.g., Grühn et al., 2010; Mroczek & Kolarz, 
1998). 
Wrzus, Müller, Wagner, Lindenberger, and Riediger (2012) studied age differences in 
psychological and physiological responses to either circumscribed or complex unpleasant 
events, that is, events that affect more than one life domain. The findings show that there 
are no age differences in negative affect when the participants deal with circumscribed 
unpleasant situations and old adults even show less pronounced cardiovascular reactions. 
In contrast, psychological as well as physiological response is more pronounced in 
response to complex unpleasant situations in old adults than in young adults. The authors 
interpret the results in light of the overpowering hypothesis that states that age differences 
in affective responding are particularly pronounced in highly resource-demanding 
situations. The study focused on differences in emotion regulation motivations and 
diminished capacities in old adults in the face of complex unpleasant events; yet, the 
results could also be interpreted as age differences in the appraised severity of the 
situation (even when number of affected life domains is controlled). A daily diary study 
relates to this interpretation in that young adults report more daily stress and more 
negative affect; however, the positive relationship between stress and negative affect is 
more pronounced in old adults (Mroczek & Almeida, 2004). In referring to Gilbert, 
Mrozek and Almeida (2004, p. 4), Mroczek et al. (2004) interpret their findings with 
regard to a kindling effect: heightened sensitivity to specific (negative) stimuli may lead 
to easier activation of negative affect when a stimulus such as stress is encountered. They 
assume that alterations in the aging brain structure (amygdala and limibic system) are 
responsible for such a development. Crime-threatening situations could pose such 
stressful situations. 
 
Laboratory Studies 
In contrast to survey studies and experience sampling studies, laboratory studies can 
control the emotion eliciting event and investigate its impact on the intensity of emotional 
responding. Results of laboratory studies show a mixed result pattern regarding emotional 
responding. The studies vary with regard to the emotion induction method as well as 
considered emotions. In studies that asked participants to remember a recent event that 
evoked a strong emotional response (including fear situations), no differences in 
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subjective emotional experience were found (Labouvie-Vief, Lumley, Jain, & Heinze, 
2003, conclusions about fear are limited because in the fear situation also other emotions 
were elicited; Levenson et al., 1991; Magai et al., 2006), although young adults exhibited 
greater physiological response than old adults. Yet, given that old adults experience 
stressful events less often, it is possible that they do not remember a comparable recent 
negative experience. Moreover, if they prevent such events from happening or bringing 
themselves in such situations, they also possibly do not remember the most threatening 
situation. Emotion regulatory goals could also prevent from remembering the most 
negative event.  
Studies using standardized material provide an alternative to this approach; yet, they may 
lack ecological validity. Tsai, Levenson, and Carstensen (2000) used short film clips to 
induce happiness and sadness. Old adults indicated as much negative affect to the sad 
film as young adults and as much happiness to the amusing film clip. Yet, as with the 
relived emotions task old adults exhibited less physiological reactivity. Notably, the kind 
of employed stimulus material matters as suggested by several other studies that tried to 
elicit sadness. When using film clips that were more age relevant (loss of children, 
Alzheimer’s disease), old adults reported more intense sadness and physiological 
response was at the same level as in young adults (Kunzmann & Grühn, 2005, two 
experiments; Kunzmann & Richter, 2009). Stimulus relevance does not seem to be the 
only relevant factor as, for example, both Seider, Shiota, Whalen, and Levenson (2011) 
and Beaudreau, MacKay, and Storandt (2009) used a film clip from the movie “The 
Champ”; however, there was no age difference in subjective experience of sadness in 
Beaudreau et al.’s study, while old adults exhibited more sadness in Seider and 
colleagues’ study. Descriptively, old adults also indicated more sadness in Beaudreau et 
al.’s study but the age range of the old age group was wider, while cell size was smaller, 
potentially resulting in less reliable assessments (Seider et al.: 60-69 years (n = 73) vs. 
Beaudreau et al.: 60-89 years (n = 30)). To the best of my knowledge, only Beaudreau et 
al. (2009) examined age differences in fear response elicited with film clips in healthy 
adults (“Silence of the lambs” and “The shining”). There was no age difference in 
subjective and physiological response to the two film clips. Yet, reservations about the 
age relevance could be voiced. The portrayed victims are young and the film material 
does not necessarily refer to the self as potential victim. 
In contrast, one study investigated age group differences for specific objects of fear, 
social threat and physical threat. Teachman and Gordon (2009) show that old adults 
reacted with higher anxiety than young participants when confronted with physical threat 
in ambiguous situations, whereas no age differences were obtained with social stressors. 
Accordingly, while no age differences have been identified using global measures of fear 
responsiveness, situational fear of crime stimuli that are equally or even more important 
to old adults could potentially evoke higher subjective fear.  
 
Experimental Approaches to Fear of Crime 
Only two experimental studies have been identified that attempted to evoke situational 
fear of crime in different age groups. Fisher, Allan, and Allan (2004) tested participants’ 
state anxiety after watching three different formats of crime newscasts about a prison 
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escape. The old age group (65 to 75 years) experienced higher state anxiety than the 
middle-aged group (35 to 45 years) only when watching the standard report format. In 
contrast, there were no age differences when the prison escape was displayed as having 
happened 3000 km away or when the escapee was portrayed in a positive light. In both 
cases anxious responding was lower than in the standard format. Ziegler and Mitchell 
(2003) asked participants about their fear at home and fear of walking outside alone after 
watching a crime-related news report (i.e., about a bank robbery or violent burglary re-
enactment). In contrast to Fisher et al., (2004) young participants (i.e., 18 to 29 years) 
reported a higher level of fear at home than the old participants (i.e., 61 to 78 years) after 
watching the burglary but not after watching the robbery. Independent from the kind of 
news report young adults indicated more fear of walking alone outside. Given that only 
two experimental studies regarding crime have been conducted it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about why their results differ (e.g., different age comparison groups, different 
crimes, stimulus material). Moreover, the studies do not situate crime in personal 
experience of everyday life and the relation between experience of situational fear and 
precautious behavior is not examined. 
Farrall et al. (2000) chose another approach. Participants were given six scenarios of two 
to three sentences describing an ambiguous situation that could contain a criminal threat. 
After reading each description, participants were asked how unsafe they would feel in 
such a situation; responses were averaged across the situations. The older the participants 
were, the more they indicated that they would feel unsafe. Yet, this study was not 
intended to evoke situational fear and it does not allow for comparing with a control 
group. All three studies extend prior research about fear of crime in that they focus on 
evoking situational fear or use another strategy of assessing fear of crime. However, they 
are limited with respect to their fear evoking stimuli, dependent variables and conclusions 
regarding precautious behavior. 
In sum, emotion developmental theories generally make no specific assumptions 
pertaining to discrete emotions but mostly focus on positive or negative affect. Most 
frequency studies show an age-related decline in negative affect; however, experiencing 
daily stress or complex unpleasant events is related to more negative affect in old adults 
than in young adults. This suggests that old adults may be more sensitive or less able to 
down regulate negative emotions in specific situations. Potentially, crime-threatening 
situations belong to this category. When studies focus on discrete emotions, fear is rather 
not the topic of investigation; even less attention is paid to age relevant fear events. 
Relived emotions studies show no age difference in subjective experience of fear; neither 
does a study using film clips. However, the film clips may not be perceived to be self-
relevant and especially not as relevant to old adults. A study distinguishing between 
social and physical threat demonstrates that physical threat results in higher anxiety in old 
than in young adults given ambiguous scenarios. This concurs with studies pertaining to 
sadness that demonstrate that the use of age relevant stimuli results in greater subjective 
experience of sadness, suggesting stimuli dependency. Moreover, previous studies that 
focused on other than componential measures of fear of crime allude to possible higher 
situational fear in old adults. 
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2.2. Health and Vulnerability 
Taking a functionalist perspective, emotions as behavior-guiding factors should respond 
to changing life conditions and needs throughout the lifespan (e.g., Keltner & Gross, 
1999; Magai, 2008). Given physical as well as cognitive losses in old age and a limited 
lifetime perspective to recover, it seems highly adaptive to maintain or even improve 
one’s ability to detect threats and respond rapidly to them in old age or avoid threats 
altogether. I will first give a brief overview of some physical and cognitive changes with 
age that could be especially related to the enhancement of a perception of physical 
vulnerability. Then I will shortly discuss the concept of (physical) vulnerability, before 
presenting findings with regard to the relationship between fear of crime and health.  
 
2.2.1. Age-related Changes in Health 
In our society aging is perceived as being associated with a deterioration of health (as 
exemplified in age stereotypes, e.g., Kornadt & Rothermund, 2011). Although this 
perception is not mirrored in all aspects of physical and cognitive functioning, research 
findings lend support for the accuracy of stereotypes for some domains. 
In a recent review, Salthouse (2010) describes age-related performance in five domains of 
cognitive functioning examined in cross-sectional studies. Oftentimes a distinction is 
made between crystallized abilities (cognitive pragmatics) as reflecting experience-based 
and culturally based knowledge and fluid abilities (cognitive mechanics) referring to 
abilities such as speed, accuracy, and executive functions based on biology (Cattell cited 
in Salthouse, 2010, p. 754; see also Baltes et al., 2006). However, Salthouse points out 
that age-related changes cannot be dealt with exclusively within these two domains as 
changes in, e.g., memory and speed follow different trajectories than would be expected 
from this distinction (i.e., pragmatics and mechanics are interdependent, cf. Baltes et al., 
2006). 
Vocabulary knowledge and general knowledge have been found to increase at least until 
people are in their 60s (Salthouse, 2010; longitudinal study: Finkel, Reynolds, McArdle, 
& Pedersen, 2005; Figure 3). In contrast, functions regarding efficiency or effectiveness 
of information processing pertaining to tasks that involve manipulations and 
transformation of abstract and familiar material and memory tasks (working and 
prospective memory) show an almost linear age-related decline (Bäckman, Small, 
Wahlin, & Larsson, 2000; Ferrer-Caja, Crawford, & Bryan, 2002; Finkel et al., 2005; 
Salthouse, 2010).  
Age-related changes in sensory functioning is, on the one hand, related to cognitive 
decline (e.g., Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997; Lindenberger, Kliegl, & Baltes, 1992; for an 
opposing position: Hofer, Berg, & Era, 2003) and, on the other hand, cognitive resources 
may help in buffering the effects of sensory decline in everyday life (Heyl & Wahl, 
2012). Sensory and motor functions are important in interacting with the world as they 
constrain which input can be processed and how we are able to respond. If, for example, 
visual function is disturbed, situational elements cannot be processed in detail, potentially 
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significant information is lost (and possibly substituted by more or less accurate 
knowledge about the situation; e.g., whether someone is carrying something dangerous, 
facial expressions). In the same vein, disturbances in auditory functioning may prevent 
from hearing warning signals. All these domains see age-related declines in functioning 
(Humes, Busey, Craig, & Kewley-Port, 2009; Schumm et al., 2009). Mobility declines 
constrict the possibility of fending off an attacker or run away (mobility declines refer to 
a variety of problems concerning balance, overweight, muscle strength, joints etc., cf. 
Wahl & Heyl, 2007). Moreover, long-lasting recovery processes and stays in hospital 
pose an additional threat to health particularly in old adults (e.g., frailty and fitness: 
Mitnitski, Graham, Mogilner, & Rockwood, 2002; femoral neck fractures: Verma, Rigby, 
Shaw, & Mohsen, 2010).  
 
Figure 3. Means and standard errors for composite scores in five abilities 
as a function of age (Figure from Salthouse, 2010, p. 755). 
 
In general, there is discussion about the question what age-related changes in cognitive 
and physical function reflect, i.e., are they (or what part of it) the result of normal aging 
processes (and when does this begin?) or reflecting illness and to what extent are they 
contingent on environmental conditions (cf. Schaie, 2005; Staudinger & Häfner, 2008)? 
In this thesis, I base further considerations on the observation that there are age-related 
declines in various bodily functions that potentially change the way how old adults relate 
to the world (and vice versa; cf. Dolan & Peasgood, 2007; Jackson & Stafford, 2009). 
These declines do not apply to all people at the same age to the same extent (actually, 
chronological age is only a crude approximation to these changes, for a critical review: 
Baars & Visser, 2007). Still, I assume that these changes can result in a sense of 
vulnerability, while not all old adults will perceive it that way (e.g., perception of risk of 
falling and associated consequences is also a construction process, cf., Ballinger & Payne, 
2002; Hughes et al., 2008).  
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2.2.2. Vulnerability 
Accordingly, I conceive (a sense of) physical vulnerability as the recognition of an “is-
ought discrepancy” (e.g., Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994) between the assumption of how 
the physical constitution ought to be to deal successfully with the environment and how it 
is perceived to actually be. Greve and Strobl (2004) point out that “coping presupposes 
the existence of a problem” and that those problems can be described as “is-ought 
discrepancies with an aversive character” (p. 194). Generally, discrepancies can be solved 
by changing the “is”-side on the one hand (problem-centered/assimilative-mode, 
Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994). In the case of the physical constitution this may mean to 
improve it. However, although increases in fitness are possible even in old adults (e.g., 
Carvalho, Marques, & Mota, 2009; Dobek, White, & Gunter, 2007), improvements seem 
to be limited. Another way of solving the discrepancy consists in changing the “ought”-
side (reaction-centered/accommodative-mode, Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994). This 
mechanism consists in reevaluating which physical functions are necessary to relate 
successfully to the environment (not consciously, though conscious efforts could give 
impetus). However, this reevaluation could be very costly, for example, when thinking 
one is strong enough to fend off an attacker and actually not being able to. 
 Greve and Strobl (2004) suggest that “a third option is avoidance of the problem (e.g., 
Haan, 1977; Vaillant, 2000), though this reaction mode cannot solve or resolve a problem 
but only dispute or reject its existence” (p. 196). Although avoidant problem solving in 
this sense may be helpful in some cases, it would equal the costs of accommodative 
problem solution in this case or hinder assimilative efforts if available. If the term 
‘avoidance’ is reserved for not acknowledging the discrepancy as a problem, then maybe 
a fourth option of how to deal with the discrepancy needs to be added. This option 
consists of accepting that there is a discrepancy that cannot be solved either by 
assimilative nor by accommodative mechanisms. The solution would consist in protecting 
oneself and avoid situations that are deemed relevant for vulnerability to play out 
negatively.14 However, when not being able to protect oneself or avoid the situation then 
higher fear should result as vulnerability is made salient (either by the actual situation or 
imagined). 
 
2.2.3. Health and Fear of Crime 
Although fear of crime has been associated with vulnerability right from the beginning 
(see chapter 1.4.2), its relation with health has scarcely been the subject of research. Yet, 
there are several studies that have investigated the relationship, although different 
measures for fear of crime complicate the picture as well as the age range of the studied 
                                                 
14
 Avoidance and protection behavior could also be framed as an alternative assimilative strategy to 
maintain the goal of physical integrity (or as compensating behavior in the terms of the theory of Selective 
Optimization and Compensation, cf. Baltes and Baltes (1990)). This aspect illustrates the difficulties in 
distinguishing between the different processes if specific behavior and goals are considered. Depending on 
the level of analysis and considered goals, different conclusions about the mechanisms at play can be 
drawn. I prefer recurring to the “fourth” option as assimilative coping implies a solution to the discrepancy, 
while the other conception allows retaining the discrepancy and the accompanying problems.  
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samples. Most studies focus only on old subjects; however, if the aim is to identify 
underlying mechanisms behind the victimization-fear paradox, then a larger age span had 
to be realized. 
The existing studies still provide insights on the relationship between physical health and 
fear. All studies show that various indicators of health are negatively related to fear, i.e., 
the less physically healthy the subjects are the more they are afraid of crime (variations of 
standard question: McCoy, Wooldredge, Cullen, Dubeck, & Browning, 1996; McKee & 
Milner, 2000; Stiles, Halim, & Kaplan, 2003; worry about different offense types: 
Jackson & Stafford, 2009; behavioral fear: Donder, Verté, & Messelis, 2005; Herbst, 
2011). Stafford et al. (2007) demonstrated that subjective measures of physical health as 
well as objective measures (walking speed and lung function) were related to worry about 
different offense types. This reflects that self-reported ratings of health status map on 
physicians’ physical examinations (Salthouse, Kausler, & Saults, 1990). Jackson 
and Stafford (2009) showed that subjective health (controlled for current depression) 
predicted worry about crime five years later.  
Herbst (2011) examined the effect of mobility, vision, hearing, and subjective health on 
precautious behavior (i.e., behavioral fear of crime). All indicators were significantly 
related with age (age span: 40-85 years). Age was positively related to precautious 
behavior and this relation was partly mediated by each of the health indicators except for 
vision. However, the relationship between age and precautious behavior was still intact. 
This may be because subjective health indicators only partly reflect physical 
vulnerability. First of all, it is an assessment of one’s health status but it may only to some 
extent reflect the subjective perception that this status does not satisfy the “ought”-side of 
being able to physically successfully relate to the world anymore. Still, with decreasing 
subjective health the probability is heightened that the “ought”-side cannot be fulfilled, 
which is potentially reflected in the relationship between health and fear of crime 
measures. Moreover, as pointed out above, perceived vulnerability should be most salient 
when precautions are not available, i.e., in situations that evoke state fear of crime.  
 
2.3. The Microgenesis and Ontogenesis of Precautious Behavior 
As outlined in the chapter on the measurement of fear of crime (chapter 1.2.3), situational 
fear refers to a transitory state of experiencing fear (e.g., while walking through a 
pedestrian tunnel at night or hearing strange noises in one’s flat) whereas dispositional 
fear refers to the inter-individual difference in the tendency to experience fear when being 
in a situation that contains potential threat. When individuals are high in dispositional fear 
they are more likely to perceive situations as threatening much faster and more easily 
across different situations. With regard to fear of crime this means that situational fear of 
crime is more probable, and is likely to be more intense when it occurs. Importantly, 
dispositional fear does not explain situational fear but rather denotes differences in the 
propensity to experience situational fear of crime.  
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Figure 4. Theoretical model of the relation between age, vulnerability, situational fear 
and precautious behavior. 
 
An individual’s dispositional fear of crime may change as a consequence of long-term 
developmental processes (as described in the chapters on inter-individual differences in 
fear of crime, chapter 1.4). With increasing vulnerability to physical losses and a 
shortened time frame to recover, fear of physical and financial damage due to crime could 
be increased. This may result in perceiving situations as threatening more easily and more 
intensely, i.e., in experiencing situational fear of crime (see Figure 4). The experience of 
situational fear or being afraid, however, may also lead to an increase in precautious 
behaviors, i.e., the behavioral aspect of fear of crime, in order to avoid situational fear. If 
this was the case, frequencies of experiencing fear of crime (i.e., the affective component) 
would be lowered, potentially resulting in comparable frequencies as young adults 
experiencing fear. Moreover, by taking into account one’s own precautious behavior, 
assessments of future victimization probability would be lowered, too. If this assumption 
should prove tenable, precautious behavior of old adults would be an expression of more 
intense (anticipated) situational fear of crime. In order to test the hypothesis that old 
adults are more afraid than young adults of becoming a victim of crime in fear-invoking 
situations, an experimental design is considered to be the most appropriate.  
 
2.4. Hypotheses of Study 1 and Study 2 
The first two studies addressed several aspects that have not been tested in this way and in 
unison before. First, a vignette technique is employed to induce fear of crime. This 
technique has been shown to be effective in inducing various emotions, especially 
negative ones (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). Stimuli were used that were 
more self-relevant in that they asked the participants to imagine themselves directly in a 
situation of potential threat and as a victim of such. This is in contrast to Fisher et al. 
(2004) and Mitchell and Ziegler (2003) where the described event had not to be 
interpreted as concerning the self but could also invoke vicarious fear. Moreover, these 
situations are much more specific than previous experimental studies of the induction of 
fear. Second, situations are addressed that are situated in everyday life to capture 
situations that could be experienced by young and old adults with equal probability (if old 
adults did not try to avoid such situations out of fear). Third, I wanted to test whether 
more situational fear is related to more precautious behavior, thereby mediating the 
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positive relation between age and precautious behavior. Fourth, the relationship between 
age, vulnerability and situational fear is studied. And fifth, I used different age groups for 
comparison but employing the same procedure in order to explore the boundaries of age 
differences. Accordingly, the same age span for the young age group (18 to 30 years) was 
sampled in both studies. The young age group’s reaction is compared with a middle-aged 
age group that is still in working age (50 to 64 years) in Study 1 and with a group of old 
adults (65 to 84 years) in Study 2.  
 
Non-situational Fear 
In order to allow comparability of results with other studies, the more “classic” non-
situational approaches to the measurement of fear of crime were included in the study. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that no significant age-related differences will be 
observed for the affective and cognitive component of fear of crime. However, significant 
age differences will be observed for the behavioral component of fear of crime. This will 
demonstrate that the middle-aged and old age group behave more cautiously than the 
young one. Moreover, significant age differences are hypothesized for the standard 
question with old adults indicating feeling less safe than young adults. Together, these 
findings ensure comparability of the samples with previous studies that employed these 
measures. 
 
Situational Fear of Crime 
In order to induce situational fear, participants were faced with five different fear of crime 
evoking everyday situations employing a vignette technique. As is implicated in the 
construct of fear of crime as a global emotional response, there is no a priori assumption, 
which situations should evoke more or less fear. Each situation varied in two threat 
levels; the higher threat level is assumed to induce more situational fear than the lower 
threat level. 
Regarding age group effects, I expect either a main effect of age with old adults 
indicating more situational fear of crime than young adults or an interaction effect with 
old adults exhibiting a larger difference than young adults in situational fear of crime 
between the low and high threat level. 
Moreover, physical vulnerability is assumed to be positively related to age and situational 
fear of crime, thereby mediating the positive relationship between age and situational 
fear. (This hypothesis will only be tested in Study 2.) 
At last, it is hypothesized that situational fear is positively related to precautious behavior 
and that this mediates the positive relationship between age and the behavioral component 
of fear of crime. (This hypothesis will only be tested in Study 2.) 
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2.5. Study 1 
2.5.1. Method 
2.5.1.1. Participants 
One hundred seventy-nine young adults (18 - 30 years old; Median = 24.0 years; 53% 
female) and one hundred and six middle-aged adults (50 - 64 years old; Median = 55.0 
years; 49% female) were recruited by students as part of a coursework in Lower Saxony 
in summer 2009. Participants were for example family members, friends, neighbors, or 
passersby in a pedestrian precinct. There were no age group differences in self-reported 
life satisfaction as measured by a single item: “How satisfied are you with your present 
life?” (6-point scale ranging from very unsatisfied (1) to very satisfied (6)). Age group 
differences were found in self-reported health as measured by a single item: “How do you 
evaluate your health status in general?” (5-point scale ranging from very bad (1) to very 
good (5)). Young adults indicated better health than middle-aged adults (Myoung = 3.91 vs. 
Mmiddle-aged = 3.60, t(279) = 3.86, p < .001).  
 
2.5.1.2. Measures 
Non-situational Measures of Fear of Crime 
The standard question of fear of crime was measured with the question: “How safe do 
you feel or would you feel if you were out alone in the dark in your living area?” (very 
unsafe (1),  quite unsafe (2), quite safe (3), and very safe (4); scale was recoded for 
analyses so that higher values indicated feeling less safe; Greve, 2000).  
The components of fear of crime scales were measured using items that were employed in 
previous studies (e.g., Greve, 2000). The affective component of fear of crime was 
operationalized as the frequency of experiencing fear with regard to eleven specific 
offences (i.e., theft of purse, theft in general, fraud, vandalism, burglary, threat or 
coercion, robbery, assault with and without a weapon, sexual coercion, and rape) in the 
past 12 months on a 5-point scale ranging from never (1) to very often (5). The cognitive 
component was measured by assessing the probability of becoming a victim of specific 
offences (same as aforementioned) on a 4-point scale ranging from very unlikely (1) to 
very likely (4). The item-scale correlations for the affective component ranged between rit 
= .41 and rit = .70. For the cognitive component they ranged between rit = .32 and rit = 
.63. Internal consistency was  = .85 and .82. 
 In order to measure precautious behavior (behavioral component) subjects were asked to 
indicate how often they undertook fourteen specific actions in order to protect themselves 
from crime and violence on a 5-point scale ranging from never (1) to very often (5) in the 
past 12 months. Items included, e.g., “did not leave home after nightfall”... “avoided 
certain streets, places or parks”...“avoided strangers”...“asked neighbors to watch out for 
the flat when away”...“did not let flat uninhabited or look like that when away”...“hid 
money/valuables in flat”...“opened door only when knowing who’s outside”. Participants 
were able to indicate when a specific behavior did not apply. The item-scale correlations 
ranged between rit = .34 and rit = .55; internal consistency was  = .81.  
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Vignettes and Situational Fear Scale(s) 
The vignette situations were first created after collecting ideas from focus groups (i.e., 
students of a research methods course conducted unstandardized interviews with their 
older relatives and peers as part of course work). From this pool, five situations were 
chosen collectively and vignettes of about 130 words were written in second-person 
perspective to enhance vividness (see Table A-1). The vignettes described everyday 
situations that had the potential to induce fear of becoming a victim of crime. Each 
vignette had two versions that only differed in one detail entailing a different threat 
intensity (i.e., threat level 1 and 2). Threat levels were constructed per vignette by varying 
one indicator that was associated with threat, for example, being with or without partner, 
light vs. darkness, potential female or male perpetrator (see Table A-1, changes in level in 
parentheses). Scenarios were chosen that depicted places that young, middle-aged, and 
old adults could seek out in principle (i.e., being at the market, at a station, at home, on a 
country road, in the park, see Table A-1). Some scenarios were more open to the 
interpretation of physical threat (e.g., park, country road, station) and others could be 
rather interpreted with regard to financial threat (market, home) although they could also 
be interpreted to include physical threat. 
Instead of comparing a neutral situation with different threatening situations, each 
vignette varied in two levels of threat intensity (threat level 1 and 2 with the higher 
number indicating higher threat). This was for two reasons. Firstly, it is difficult to create 
a suitable neutral situation that could serve as a comparison condition and fit equally well 
for young and old adults. Even if there was a comparable neutral situation, it could be 
problematic to compare responses to emotional stimuli with non-emotional stimuli. 
Second, demand characteristics are one of the problems inherent in emotion induction 
methods. Even if one chose a within-subject design with pre- and post induction 
measurement, young and old adults could be differentially prone to report feelings of fear, 
thereby confounding age differences in fear response with differences in demand 
characteristics. By varying threat level between subjects per vignette, demand 
characteristics (if they play a role) are given for both conditions. If there are differences in 
response to the threat level, they should not be due to demand characteristics because all 
subjects are asked to imagine themselves in the potentially threatening scenario.  
Participants were instructed to read each vignette thoroughly and try to imagine the 
scenario in real life. After reading the story, participants were then asked to indicate to 
what extent they were able to relate to the story (not at all (1) to very good (4), henceforth 
called ‘story relation’). This was included to measure the extent that individuals are able 
to relate to the story as this is a person factor that may influence the effectiveness of the 
vignettes (Westermann et al., 1996). In the third stage of the task, participants were 
instructed to indicate, using a 7-point scale (i.e., not at all (1) to very/extremely (7)), the 
extent they would agree with 11 statements concerning feelings related to fear in various 
situations. Only six items from the State Anxiety Scale of the German version of the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & Spielberger, 1981; e.g., 
feeling tense, worried, secure) were utilized in the two studies. Sylvers et al. (2011) and 
Englert, Bertrams, and Dickhäuser (2011) noted that the two subscales, measuring either 
state or trait anxiety, of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory correlated highly with 
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instruments measuring depressive symptoms. Those items were chosen that shared face 
validity with the fear construct and added with five items related to fear in order to 
enhance scale properties (e.g., being scared, feeling panicky, feeling threatened; see 
Appendix C for the full scale in the questionnaire, p. 4). Three items from the State 
Anxiety Scale were keyed in a positive direction and reverse coded for analyses so that 
higher values on all items indicate higher situational fear. Scales were created by 
calculating the mean across the eleven statements for each vignette separately. Internal 
consistencies per vignette ranged from Cronbach’s  = .92 to  = .97.  
 
 
2.5.1.3. Procedure 
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first part asked for the basic 
demographic information (i.e., age and gender), subjective health, life satisfaction, and 
the standard question. The second part of the measure included the five vignettes. Each 
participant read five vignettes, each of them being one of the two versions of a vignette 
(i.e., threat level as between-subjects factor per vignette). The five vignettes alternated 
within subjects in their sequence between threat level 1 in one vignette and threat level 2 
in the next, i.e., this ensured that each participant did not receive five vignettes that were 
all within one threat level. The order of vignette content varied in 4 different ways, 
always ending with the car breakdown scenario. There were no effects of order. 
The questionnaire was handed out to subjects in various settings (e.g., at home, at work, 
in the street) at different times of day; participants were asked to fill them out alone. 
Questionnaires could be given back immediately after answering or send back to 
university. The setting varied individually; however, because the different versions were 
randomly administered per gender-by-age group, this should not affect the differential age 
and threat effects systematically. 
 
2.5.1.4. Data Analyses 
In a first step, parallel univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted on the 
non-situational measures of fear of crime and the standard question. Age (young vs. 
middle-aged) and gender (female vs. male) were between-subject quasi-experimental 
factors.  
Second, in order to test the hypotheses with regard to situational fear of crime, 2 (age 
group: young vs. middle-aged) × 2 (threat level: 1 vs. 2) covariance analyses with gender 
and story relation as covariates were conducted for each vignette separately.15 Self-
reported situational fear was the dependent variable in each vignette. The partial eta 
squares representing the portion of explained variance in the dependent variable are 
reported for each significant effect. The following eta squares correspond with small 
(.10), medium (.25), and large (.40) effect sizes (ƒ) respectively: 2 = .01, 2 = .06, 2 = 
.14 (Cohen, 1988). 
                                                 
15
 Analyses showed no significant interaction effects between age and gender. 
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As this thesis is not concerned with gender effects, no explicit hypotheses regarding 
gender are tested. However, gender has been shown to be one of the most replicable 
factors associated with differences in fear of crime (for a review: Hale, 1996; May, Rader, 
& Goodrum, 2010). Therefore, gender is included in all analyses as control variable, 
which is especially important when cell sizes are not equally distributed across age-by-
gender groups. Results for gender are reported but not discussed if not relevant for the 
research question.  
 
 
2.5.2. Results 
2.5.2.1. Non-situational Fear of Crime 
The parallel ANOVAs on the affective, cognitive, and behavioral component of fear of 
crime as well as on the standard question showed that age was only significantly different 
for the behavioral component, F(1, 267) = 7.73, p < .01, ² = .03. As in prior studies, old 
middle-aged adults reported taking more precautions (M = 2.29) than young adults (M = 
2.09, see Table 2). The results for the standard question deviated from prior studies by 
showing no significant age difference, F(1, 267) = 0.19, n.s.. Confirming prior studies, 
there were no significant differences between the age groups in the affective and 
cognitive component. Except for the results of the standard question, the results mirrored 
those of prior (large scale) studies. 
 
Table 2  
Mean and standard deviations in non-situational measures of fear of crime for young and 
middle-aged adults in Study 1 and young and old adults in Study 2 
 Study 1  Study 2 
 Young Middle-aged  Young Old  
 M SD M SD  M SD M SD 
Affective 
component 1.88 .57 1.76 .60  1.96 .06 1.93 .07 
Cognitive 
component 1.69 .37 1.67 .38  1.73 .04 1.85 .04 
Behavioural 
component 2.09
* 
.57 2.29* .73  2.31** .06 2.95** .06 
Standard 
question 1.84 .64 1.80 .62  1.85
** 
.06 2.16** .06 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Regarding gender, there was a significant effect in the affective, F(1, 267) = 4.34, p < .05, 
² = .02, and behavioral component, F(1, 267) = 25.44, p < .001, ² = .09, and a 
marginally significant effect in the cognitive component, F(1, 267) = 3.73, p = .054, ² = 
.01. Female respondents reported a higher frequency of feeling afraid, evaluated their risk 
of becoming a victim of crime higher, and took more precautions. Moreover, there was a 
significant effect of gender on the standard question, F(1, 267) = 23.61, p < .001, ² = .08, 
indicating that female participants felt less safe. There were no interaction effects 
between age and gender. 
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2.5.2.2. Situational Fear 
Threat manipulation 
As can be seen in Table 3, effectiveness of threat manipulation was achieved in three 
vignettes (car breakdown: F(1, 265) = 87.49, p < .001, ² = .25; park: F(1, 268) = 5.20, p 
= .023, ² = .02; market: F(1, 271) = 16.54, p < .001, ² = .06). Self-reported fear was 
higher in the more threatening scenario in each case (car breakdown: Mthreat level 1 = 3.04; 
M
 threat level 2 = 4.58; park: threat level 1 = 4.45; M threat level 2 = 4.77; market: M threat level 1 = 2.07; 
M
 threat level 2 = 2.57).  
 
 
Figure 5. Estimated marginal means of young and middle-aged adults’ situational fear by 
threat level (level 1 vs. 2) for each vignette in Study 1. (Gender and story relation as 
covariates. Error bars indicate one standard error above and below the mean.) 
 
Age Effects 
Age group differences were obtained in two vignettes (park: F(1, 268) = 10.07, p < .01, ² 
= .04; home: F(1, 270) = 6.54, p < .05, ² = .02). Contrary to hypothesis, young adults 
exhibited more situational fear than middle-aged participants (park: Myoung = 4.84, Mmiddle-
aged = 4.38; home: Myoung = 4.56, Mmiddle-aged  = 4.12). There were no further age group 
effects, ps > .10 (see Table 3 and Figure 5).  
 
Story Relation and Gender 
Overall, story relation was high ranging from M = 2.60 (SD = 0.82) in the car breakdown 
scenario to M = 3.20 (SD = 0.78) in the train station scenario. It showed significant 
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influences on situational fear in the park, home, and market vignette. Subjects who were 
better able to relate to the story showed higher situational fear; separate analyses showed 
that this effect was independent from age. Across all vignettes women indicated a higher 
situational fear than men. 
 
Table 3  
Mean Values and Standard Deviation in situational fear of crime for each vignette for 
young and old adults in Study 1 and Study 2. 
Study 1 
Vignette  Threat Level 
 
Mean  
Standard 
Deviation  Effect sizea 
Young 
Middle-
aged  Young 
Middle-
aged  Threat Age T × A 
 
Market  
 
1  2.05 2.21  0.84 1.04  
.06*** .00 .00 2  2.65 2.69  1.02 1.18  
Car 
breakdown 
 
1  3.00 3.01  1.31 1.39  
.25*** .01 .01 2  4.69 4.43  1.48 1.50  
Train station 
 
1  4.16 4.17  1.30 1.44  
.00 .00 .01 2  4.22 3.91  1.34 1.28  
Park 
 
1  4.60 4.06  1.43 1.38  
.02* .04** .00 2  4.97 4.67  1.46 1.44  
Home 
 
1  4.59 4.24  1.48 1.53  
.00 .02** .00 2  4.61 4.17  1.44 1.30  
Study 2 
 Young Old  Young Old  Threat Age T × A 
Market  
 
1  2.18 2.34  0.91 1.07  
.05** .00 .00 2  2.73 2.69  1.05 1.05  
Car 
breakdown 
 
1  2.95 3.73  1.31 1.61 
 .19*** 
.05** .02* 2  4.48 4.74  1.46 1.45 
 
 
Bus stop 
 
1  4.17 4.12  1.22 1.45  
.00 .01 .02* 2  4.20 4.55  1.47 1.35 
 
Park 
 
1  4.45 3.97  1.42 1.34  
.01† .01 .00 2  4.84 4.46  1.58 1.61 
 
Home 
 
1  4.63 4.27  1.41 1.35  
.00 .03* .00 2  4.71 4.22  1.40 1.34  
Note. T × A =Threat × Age; a Effect sizes are partial eta squares (2) and relate to ANCOVAs including 
gender and story relation as covariates.  
†
 p < .10 * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.  
 
 
2.5.3. Desiderata of Study 1 
Compared with previous findings of the relation between age and non-situational 
measures of fear of crime, the data replicate the findings of large-scale studies except for 
the standard question. The five vignettes elicited different intensities of fear ranging from 
relatively low to moderate intensities in self-reported fear representing a broad spectrum 
of crime-threatening scenarios. Moreover, in three of the five scenarios the threat 
manipulation was effective, which allows interpreting group differences as stemming 
from differences in perceiving threat. Yet, two scenarios elicited no difference depending 
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on threat level that is why they were modified slightly in Study 2. Although this reduces 
the possibility of comparing the results of Study 1 and 2, this is done to increase the 
validity of the scenarios and improve testing age group differences. This is especially 
relevant with regard to ecological validity. The market scenario was situated in Spain, 
where old adults may not travel (anymore). Moreover, train stations may also be less 
relevant for rural inhabitants. 
Regarding age effects, no interaction effects with age were obtained. Instead, two main 
effects of age revealed higher situational fear intensity in the young participants in the 
park and home vignette. In Study 2 it is tested whether these effects are also found for the 
comparison between young and old adults. Moreover, the relationship between physical 
vulnerability and situational fear is tested as well as the relationship between situational 
fear and precautious behavior. Situational fear is supposed to mediate the relationship 
between age and precautious behavior. As age was negatively related to situational fear in 
two vignettes in Study 1 and unrelated to the other vignettes, situational fear could not 
serve as a mediator in the present study.  
 
2.6. Study 2 
2.6.1. Method 
 
2.6.1.1. Participants 
Two hundred forty-three adults were recruited in Lower Saxony, Germany, in January 
2010 (young: 18 - 30 years, N = 129; Median = 22.0 years; 51.9% female; old: 65 - 84 
years, N = 114, Median = 71.0 years; 44.7% female). A broad spectrum of participants 
was represented in the sample. Young participants included students, technical and 
administrative employees at the university, pupils, apprentices, and employees at social 
welfare offices. Old participants were recruited from choirs, sports clubs, and facilities for 
further education. Originally, more subjects were sampled (Ntotal = 343) but were not 
retained in the study as they either did not meet the age range criteria or were recruited in 
nursing homes for the elderly. I decided to exclude the data of the nursing home residents 
after recruitment because their living arrangements differed considerably from those of 
the other participants, young and old.16 Moreover, in order of this study to be comparable 
with other studies in the criminological field but adding a different methodology, a 
similar group of subjects should be sampled.   
There were no age group differences in self-reported life satisfaction as measured by the 
same item as in Study 1. In addition to evaluating their general health status (reverse 
coded in comparison with Study 1), participants were asked to judge their flexibility of 
arms and legs, their vision (including glasses/lenses), hearing abilities, and fitness on a 4-
point scale ranging from very good (1) to bad (4). Young adults indicated a significantly 
better health status than old adults on all items (global: Myoung = 1.99 vs. Mold = 2.32, t(237) 
                                                 
16
 Interestingly, results for this subsample did not differ from the old age sample in situational fear, but 
participants in nursing homes indicated less precautious behavior. 
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= -3.92, p < .001; flexibility: Myoung = 1.43 vs. Mold = 2.32, t(239) = -7.46, p < .001; vision: 
Myoung = 1.53 vs. Mold = 2.17, t(239) = -7.09, p < .001; hearing: Myoung = 1.61 vs. Mold = 
2.58, t(238) = -7.59, p < .001; fitness: Myoung = 2.16 vs. Mold = 2.58, t(239) = -4.03, p < 
.001). 
  
2.6.1.2. Measures 
Non-situational Measures of Fear of Crime 
The same measures as in Study 1 were used. The item-scale correlations for the affective 
component ranged between rit = .41 and rit = .79. For the cognitive component they 
ranged between rit = .36 and rit = .68. Internal consistency was  = .89 and  = .79. 
Regarding precautious behavior, item-scale correlations ranged between rit = .18 and rit = 
.55; internal consistency was  = .79.  
 
Vignettes and Situational Fear Scale(s) 
The same vignette scenarios as in Study 1 were used with two modifications (see Table 
A-1). The market scenario was transferred from Spain to Germany and the train situation 
was replaced by the same situation taking place at a bus stop. This was done in order to 
render those situations more applicable to old adults and to increase the difference 
between the threatening levels.  
Again, the 11 statements concerning fear in such a situation were measured. Internal 
consistencies per vignette ranged from Cronbach’s  = .91 to  = .95. 
  
Physical Vulnerability 
Items to measure subjective physical vulnerability in Study 2 were extracted from a larger 
set of vulnerability related items that were used in an unpublished master thesis (Ehrhorn 
& Greve, 1999). Physical vulnerability comprised eight items measured on a 4-point scale 
ranging from not at all true (1) to very true (4). The items were worded without reference 
to crime but rather focused on the perception of the constitution of the body: ‘I feel 
fragile’, ‘I get ill easily’, ‘I am quite fit for my age’ (reverse coded), ‘I have more health 
problems than other people’, ‘If I broke my bones right now, it would be devastating’, ‘I 
am burdened by illness’, ‘I feel physically inferior to most other people’, or ‘I only heal 
very slowly if injured’. For the scale, higher values indicated greater physical 
vulnerability. Item-scale correlations ranged between rit = .27 and rit = .52; internal 
consistency was Cronbach’s  = .71.  
 
2.6.1.3. Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Study 1 except for order. Sixteen different orders were 
realized, always starting with the market scenario. There were no order effects detected 
on the outcomes. 
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2.6.1.4. Data Analyses 
Analytical procedures replicated those of Study 1. 
conducted. As a possible mediator in the relationship between 
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written by Hayes (2012). Unfortunately, elaboration on effect size measures has not 
developed so far yet as to calculate effect sizes in models that include covariates and 
moderators. Therefore, effect sizes are reported for coefficients in simple path analyses 
with only one mediator and the residuals of the criterion being z-standardized after being 
regressed on the other predictor variables that cannot be included in the model to 
calculate the effect size. Preacher and Kelly (2011) compare the properties of ² to that of 
r²xy, which is why Cohen’s definition of small, medium, and large effect sizes as .01, .09, 
and .25 can be applied (Cohen, 1988).   
For the path analyses age group, gender, and threat level were effect-coded beforehand 
(age: young = -1, old = 1; gender: female = -1, male = 1; threat: low = -1, high = 1). 
Moreover, vulnerability and story relation were centered on their sample mean (Aiken & 
West, 1991). Situational fear of crime for each vignette was the criterion, which was 
regressed on age group and threat level as predictors. Situational fear was also regressed 
on vulnerability as mediator variable, which was regressed on age group. As will be 
shown there were significant interaction effects between age group and threat level on 
situational fear in the car breakdown and bus stop scenario. Consequently, interaction 
terms were included in these analyses. The interaction terms were constructed by 
multiplying the simple terms (Aiken & West, 1991). Accordingly, situational fear was 
additionally regressed on the interaction term of age group with threat level and 
vulnerability with threat level (see Figure 6 dashed lines) in these cases. If age group 
effects on situational fear are moderated by threat level, this effect could still be mediated 
by vulnerability. The threat level could influence whether perceptions of vulnerability are 
relevant or at least vary as a function of the level of threat. In this sense, a mediated 
moderation is tested when including these interaction terms (e.g., Muller, Judd, & 
Yzerbyt, 2005). Finally, gender and story relation were included as covariates. 
Moreover, a structural equation model (SEM) was tested to examine the relationships 
between age, vulnerability, situational fear, and precautious behavior. However, as the 
application is partly adapted to the results of previous analyses, the details of the analysis 
are reported in the respective chapter. 
As in Study 1, gender effects are included as covariates and results are reported. I only 
refer to the results in the main text when they contribute to the research question.  
 
2.6.2. Results 
2.6.2.1. Non-situational Measures of Fear of Crime 
As in Study 1, I conducted four parallel ANOVAs on the non-situational fear-of-crime 
measures and the standard question with age and gender as between-subject factors. As 
hypothesized, there was no significant difference between the age groups with regard to 
the affective component, F(1, 220) = 0.19, n.s. (see Table 2). There was a marginally 
significant difference between the age groups concerning the cognitive component, F(1, 
220) = 3.87, p = .05, which showed that old adults judged their victimization risk 
somewhat higher (M = 1.85) than young adults (M = 1.73). Replicating previous findings, 
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old adults differed significantly from young adults with regard to precautious behavior, 
F(1, 220) = 56.92, p < .001, ² = .21, and the standard question, F(1, 220) = 13.60, p < 
.001, ² = .06. Old adults indicated higher values on the behavioral component (Myoung = 
2.31, Mold = 2.95) and feeling more unsafe in the standard question (Myoung = 1.85, Mold = 
2.16) than young adults. 
Concerning gender, female respondents reported taking more precautious behaviors, F(1, 
220) = 12.65, p < .001, ² = .05, and feeling less safe in the standard question, F(1, 220) = 
51.16, p < .001, ² = .19. There was no significant gender effect regarding the affective 
and cognitive component. Moreover, there were no significant interaction effects between 
age and gender. 
  
2.6.2.2. Situational Fear 
Threat Manipulation 
The threat manipulation was efficient in two vignettes (car breakdown: F(1, 216) = 51.35, 
p < .001, ² = .19; market: F(1, 218) = 11.27, p < .01, ² = .05) and marginally significant 
in the park vignette (park: F(1, 214) = 3.03, p = .083, ² = .01), thus replicating results of 
Study 1. In each of those vignettes, the more threatening scenario elicited a higher value 
of situational fear (car breakdown: Mthreat level 1 = 3.31 vs. Mthreat level 2 = 4.64; park: Mthreat 
level 1 = 4.34 vs. Mthreat level 2 = 4.64; market: Mthreat level 1 = 2.26 vs. Mthreat level 2 = 2.73).  
 
Age Effects 
Age group effects were obtained in three vignettes (see Table 3 and Figure 7). Old adults 
indicated significantly more situational fear in the car breakdown vignette than young 
adults, F(1, 216) = 11.09, p < .01, ² = .05 (Myoung = 3.67 vs. Mold = 4.28). This effect was 
qualified by an interaction between age group and threat level, F(1, 216) = 4.94, p < .05, 
² = .02. The difference in situational fear between young and old adults was larger in the 
vignette version with lower threat (Myoung = 2.80 vs. Mold = 4.53; difference = 1.73) than 
in the vignette with higher threat (Myoung = 3.83 vs. Mold = 4.74; difference = .91). Two 
follow-up covariance analyses for both threat levels separately revealed that the 
difference between the age groups was only significant in the lower threat condition 
(lower threat: F(1, 100) = 11.17, p < .01, ² = .10 vs. higher threat: F(1, 114)  < 1.0, p > 
.10). Moreover, an interaction effect between age group and the threat manipulation was 
found in the bus stop vignette, F(1, 116) = 4.24, p < 0.05, ² = .02 (lower threat: Myoung = 
4.27 vs. Mold = 4.19; difference = -0.08 vs. higher threat: Myoung = 4.00 vs. Mold = 4.65; 
difference = 0.65). Follow-up covariance analyses separately for both threat levels 
showed that old adults indicated more fear of crime than young adults only in the higher 
threatening vignette version (lower threat: F(1, 123) < 1.0, p > .10 vs. higher threat: F(1, 
91) = 5.70, p < .05, ² = .06). Looking at these results, the hypothesis of increased 
situational fear with age seems to be at least partly supported.  
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Yet, contrary to hypothesis but replicating findings of the first study, young participants 
were significantly more fearful than old participants in the home vignette, F(1, 213) = 
6.55, p < .05, ² = .03 (Myoung = 4.70 vs. Mold = 4.24). Moreover, although not 
significantly different for the two age groups, young adults exhibited also greater 
situational fear in the park vignette than old adults, which mirrored the results of Study 1 
(see Table 3).  
 
Story Relation and Gender 
Again, being able to relate to the story had an influence on the bus stop, park, and home 
vignette independent from age. The better a participant could relate to the scenario the 
higher was situational fear of crime. Story relation was also high (MCar breakdown = 2.80, MHome  
= 2.99, MPark  = 3.13, MBus stop = 3.15, MMarket  = 3.17). Moreover, as in Study 1, women 
indicated more situational fear across all vignettes but the market scenario.  
    
 
Figure 7. Estimated marginal means of young and old adults’ situational fear by threat 
level (level 1 vs. 2) for each vignette in Study 2. (Gender and story relation as covariates. 
Error bars indicate one standard error above and below the mean.) 
 
2.6.2.3. Influence of Vulnerability 
As can be seen in Table 4, age was significantly positively correlated with vulnerability (r 
= .18, p < .05), i.e., old adults saw themselves as being physically more vulnerable than 
young adults. Furthermore, a higher vulnerability perception was significantly related to 
more situational fear of crime in all but one vignette (ranging from rpark = .11 to rmarket = 
.41; situational fear is z-residualized on threat level manipulation in this case). Moreover, 
although subjective health and vulnerability are positively correlated with r = .45, p < .01 
(sharing 20% of variance), it can be seen that physical vulnerability is not the same as 
subjective health.   
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In order to test mediational effects of vulnerability and situational fear in the relation 
between age and precautious behavior, i.e., the behavioral component of fear of crime, I 
conducted five path analyses (Table 5 and Table 6). As could already be seen from 
correlation, age had a positive relation with vulnerability (B = .08,  = .18, p < .01). 
Moreover, vulnerability was positively related to situational fear in all vignettes (BCar 
Breakdown = 0.96, BBus Stop = 0.63, BPark = 0.47, BHome = 0.57, and BMarket = 0.94; ps < .05) 
indicating that greater vulnerability is connected to greater situational fear. Regarding 
mediating effects of vulnerability, it can be seen in the tables that the indirect effect of 
age on situational fear is significant in three of the five vignettes (abCar = .07, abBus Stop = 
.06, abMarket = .07, ps < .05; ²Car = .06, ²Bus Stop = .05, ²Market = .08) and marginally 
significant in the other two (abPark = .04, abHome = .05, ps < .10; ²Park = .03, ²Home = .04). 
The older a person was the more they perceived themselves as vulnerable and the more 
situational fear was expressed.  
Table 4  
Correlation matrix 
Note. Age and gender effect-coded (young = -1 vs. old = 1; female = -1 vs. male = 1). Situational fear was 
z-residualized on threat level for each vignette. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Looking at the effect sizes indicates that a small to medium part of the age effect on 
situational fear can be attributed to perceptions of vulnerability. This is also expressed, on 
the one hand, in the remaining significant positive effect of age in the car breakdown 
vignette. Old adults indicated more situational fear independent from vulnerability (Myoung 
= 3.93 vs. Mold = 4.37). On the other hand, the age group effect on situational fear became 
marginally significant in the park vignette and was significant in the home vignette. Yet, 
in those scenarios young adults reported more situational fear than old adults (park: Myoung 
= 4.72 vs. Mold = 4.40; home: Myoung = 4.82 vs. Mold = 4.28). A significant indirect effect of 
age group via vulnerability suggests in this case an attenuating effect of vulnerability. The 
inclusion of the mediator controls for the part of variance in the age group that is opposite 
to the sign of the overall age group effect in those scenarios. Consequently, once this 
  Age G Aff Cog Beh H Vul Car Bus Market Park 
Gender (G) .07 
          
Affective 
(Aff) -.03 -.08 
         
Cognitive 
(Cog) .11 -.10 .65
**
 
        
Behavioral 
(Beh) .44
**
 -.17** .38** .44** 
       
Health (H) .51** .02 .13 .17** .26** 
      
Vulnerability 
(Vul) .18
**
 .00 .32** .36** .26** .45** 
     
Car 
breakdown   .16
*
 -.34** .27** .30** .41** .18** .31** 
    
Bus stop .04 -.26** .25** .25** .33** .12 .22** .48** 
   
Market  .02 -.06 .39** .26** .24** .18** .41** .35** .35** 
  
Park  -.14* -.50** .27** .21** .23** -.09 .11 .49** .59** .33** 
 
Home  -.15* -.27** .26** .20** .22** .02 .17** .42** .50** .42** .64** 
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influence is controlled for, the negative effect of age group even increases.  
Moreover, I included the interaction terms between age and threat level, and vulnerability 
and threat level, respectively. As indicated by the significant indirect effect of the age-by-
threat level interaction on situational fear in the bus stop scenario (ab = 0.05, p < .05), 
some part of the influence of the interaction term on situational fear was mediated by the 
threat level-moderated influence of vulnerability. This indirect effect was not significant 
in the car breakdown vignette. 
Furthermore, as the lack of a correlation between gender and vulnerability already 
indicated, the effect of gender on situational fear remained unchanged after inclusion of 
vulnerability (Table 5 and Table 6). 
Table 5  
Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Situational Fear in the scenarios car breakdown 
and bus stop 
 Car Breakdown Bus Stop 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B B  95% CI B B  
95% 
CI 
Constant 4.02 4.15  [3.97, 4.32] 4.28 4.36  
[4.19, 
4.53] 
Age 0.31** 0.22* 0.14 [0.04, 0.41] 0.14 0.06 0.05 
[-0.13, 
0.25] 
Threat Level 0.66*** 0.61*** 0.38 [0.43, 0.78] 0.05 0.07 0.05 
[-0.11, 
0.25] 
Age × Threat 
Level -0.19* -0.14 -0.08 
[-0.32, 
0.04] 0.18* 0.11 0.08 
[-0.08, 
0.29] 
Vulnerability  0.96*** 0.26 [0.64, 1.31]  0.63** 0.20 
[0.26, 
1.00] 
Vuln. × Threat 
Level  -0.26 -0.08 
[-0.59, 
0.07]  0.19 0.06 
[-0.20, 
0.57] 
Gender -0.54*** -0.53*** -0.33 [-0.70,  
-0.36] -0.39*** -0.37*** -0.27 
[-0.53,   
-0.21] 
Story Relation 0.11 0.06 0.03 [-0.18, 0.30] 0.47** 0.47** 0.24 
[0.20, 
0.74] 
R2 .32 .39 .15 .18 
Chi²  12.17**  2.21 
RMSEA  .112 [0.05, 0.18]  .000 [0.00, 0.10] 
Indirect effect 
of Age on 
Situational Fear 
(abAge) 
 0.07* [0.01, 0.14]  0.06* [0.00, 0.11] 
² (abAge)  .06 [.01, .12]  .05 [.01, .11] 
Indirect effect 
of Age × Threat 
Level on 
Situational Fear 
 -0.03 [-0.09, 0.03]  0.05* [0.00, 0.09] 
Note. The number of missing observations (and thus the size of N) differs between the several models. CI = 
confidence interval. Age, gender, and threat level effect-coded (age: young = -1, old = 1; gender: female = -
1, male = 1; threat: low = -1, high = 1).   
Vulnerability and Story Relation mean-centered. RMSEA: 90% confidence interval in brackets. Indirect 
effects and ²: 95% confidence interval in brackets. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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2.6.2.4. Situational Fear, Vulnerability, and Precautious Behavior 
As outlined above, one potential explanation for the more frequent precautious behaviors 
of old adults consists in an increase of dispositional fear being visible in an increase of 
situational fear across various situations. This is assumed to be related to precautious 
behaviors in order to avoid such situations. The increase in situational fear is 
hypothesized to be based on an increase in vulnerability. The prior analyses already 
showed that being old was only related to expressing more fear in some vignettes and that 
this was only partly explained by increases in vulnerability. Still, it is of interest whether 
this specific age-related increase in situational fear is connected with more precautious 
behavior.  
Accordingly, I employed a structural equation model to test the hypothesis that the effect 
of age on precautious behavior is mediated by situational fear that is mediated by an 
increase in vulnerability. Covariance matrices were analyzed by applying the maximum 
likelihood procedure as a method of parameter estimation. Moreover, to retain as much of 
data information as possible, Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML: Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation with an item missing data imputation routine, Wothke, 2000) was 
used as estimation procedure. A structural equation model was chosen because it allowed 
including shared variance of different scenarios while simultaneously controlling for non-
shared variance treated as residual variance.  
Since old adults indicated more situational fear only in the vignettes of car breakdown 
and bus stop, only those variables were included in the model. Both variables were 
regressed on threat level beforehand in order to control for differences due to this 
manipulation. The residuals were z-standardized and correlated positively with each other 
(r = .48, p < .01; Table 4). Therefore, both variables were included in the model as 
manifest variables being represented by the latent factor ‘situational fear’. Moreover, 
vulnerability was included as latent factor being represented by two indicators (each 
indicator was created by the mean of four vulnerability items). As in the path analyses, 
age group and gender were effect-coded (age: young = -1, old = 1; gender: female = -1, 
male = 1). Precautious behavior was included in the model as a manifest continuous 
dependent variable. As can be seen in Figure 8, precautious behavior was regressed on 
age group as predictor variable and on vulnerability and situational fear as mediators. 
Furthermore, precautious behavior was regressed on gender as covariate. Residual 
variances were specified as being uncorrelated. This model showed acceptable fit, ²(8) = 
9.88, n.s.; CFI = .994; RMSEA = 0.031 (0.000, 0.085). As depicted in Figure 8, all factor 
loadings were reasonable, which is a further indication of an acceptable fit. 
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Figure 8. Cross-sectional structural equation model
precautious behavior via vulnerability via situatio
n.s.; CFI = .994; RMSEA = 0.031 (0.000, 0.085); *
R²behavior = .39. 
On the measurement level, standardized factor loadi
variances of the indicators are shown. 
 
The model can be decomposed into different parts. The first part con
between age, situational fear, and vulnerability as studied in the previous chapte
was positively related to vulnerability (
related to situational fear (B = 0.92, 
situational fear was nonsignificant (
via vulnerability was significant (
reiterates the results of the prior path
are attributable to differences in vulnerability (a
The second part concerns the prediction of precauti
vulnerability and situational fear. While situation
related to precautious behavior (B
0.03,  = .01, n.s.). This was due to the indirect effect of vulnerability on pr
behavior via situational fear (ab
differences in precautious behavior due
situational fear. What is of interest is
was mediated by vulnerability via situational fear. The
significant (standardized ab = 0.10, 
specific indirect effects, i.e., indirect effects v
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situational fear via vulnerability was marginally significant, indicating that old adults 
perceived higher vulnerability resulting in higher situational fear, which again was related 
to more precautious behavior. This is in concordance with the hypothesis. However, there 
remained a considerable positive direct effect of age group on precautious behavior even 
after inclusion of the mediators (B = 0.25,  = .35, p < .001). This indicates that parts of 
age-related differences in precautious behavior cannot be explained by differences in 
vulnerability, and hence, situational fear. 
The third part of the model concerns the effects of gender. As could already be seen in the 
ANCOVA’s for situational fear, female participants reported more situational fear in all 
but one scenario. This is reflected in the significant regression coefficient in the SEM (B 
= -0.35,  = -.44, p < .001).  However, there was no significant correlation between 
gender and vulnerability so that it could function as a mediator (see Table 4). Yet, gender 
showed a negative correlation with precautious behavior (r = -.17, p < .01), signifying 
that female participants took more precautions than male participants. In the SEM the 
direct effect of gender on precautious behavior was no longer significant, while the 
indirect effect via situational fear was significant (ab = 0.14, standardized ab = .20, p < 
.01). This means that female adults reported more situational fear, which was related to 
indicating more precautious behavior. 
 
2.6.3. Desiderata of Study 2 
As in Study 1, a mixed result pattern was obtained in Study 2. Two scenarios indicated 
higher situational fear in the old age group at one of the two threat levels (car breakdown 
and bus stop). This result would lend support for the assumption that old adults respond 
more strongly with fear of crime, when they are asked to imagine themselves in specific 
threatening situations, i.e., they respond with more situational fear indicating an increase 
in dispositional fear. Yet, young adults reported more situational fear in the same 
scenarios as in Study 1 (home and descriptively in park scenario). This result speaks 
against a general increase of situational fear of crime with age and, thus, against an age-
related increase in dispositional fear.  
Young adults tended to indicate more fear of crime in moderately threatening situations 
(given the theoretical mean of the scale for situational fear), while old adults indicated 
more fear than young adults in the lower threatening car breakdown scenario (although 
the bus stop scenario contradicts this observation). Similar to Study 1, threat level 
manipulation did not result in differences in situational fear in all vignettes. In order to 
distinguish whether age differences vary in dependence of a specific situation or threat 
intensity, a better variation of threat level within situations would be necessary. 
Accordingly, four threat levels are implemented in Study 3 to test whether age group 
differences depend on the level of threat or situation. I will attend to potential 
explanations of this in the general discussion of this section (chapter 2.8). 
Given that young adults reported higher situational fear than old middle-aged and old 
adults in two scenarios, it seems that the two old age groups are comparable in their fear 
response. However, old adults responded with more situational fear than young adults in 
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two scenarios (under different threat levels), while middle-aged adults did not. Yet, direct 
comparisons of results between young, old middle-aged and old adults are not possible as 
I have used modified vignettes. However, the car breakdown vignette was not modified 
and still obtained age differences between the young and the old age group in Study 2, 
while there were no age differences in Study 1. This suggests that old adults may be more 
susceptible to threat than old middle-aged adults at least in some situations. 
Moreover, in some experimental studies young adults indicated higher values in negative 
affect and lower values in positive affect already at baseline (Labouvie-Vief et al., 2003; 
Beaudreau et al., 2009). This age group difference could transfer into the response to the 
vignettes, possibly undermining underlying age group differences in response to the 
vignettes. Consequently, in Study 3 a baseline measurement is included. In order to 
minimize demand characteristics when only asking for fear responses at baseline and in 
response to the vignettes, a different measure is employed that includes a variety of 
positive and negative items.  
This also provides the opportunity to test other responses to the crime-threatening 
scenarios. As Ditton et al. (1999; cf. also Jackson, 2009) have criticized, fear is not the 
only possible response to crime. They suggest that anger would also be a highly relevant 
response to crime. Similarly, feeling ashamed is a crime-related emotion oftentimes 
studied with regard to post-victimization symptoms (e.g., Andrews, Brewin, Rose, & 
Kirk, 2000; Semb, Strömsten, Sundbom, Fransson, & Henningsson, 2011; Shorey et al., 
2011).  
2.7. Study 3 
2.7.1. Innovations Compared With Study 1 and 2 and Hypotheses 
Innovations 
There are several innovations implemented in Study 3 resulting from desiderata of 
Studies 1 and 2 and first attempts at approaching alternative explanations to the relation 
between age and precautious behavior. These innovations concern:  
(1) Four age groups are included (young adults = YA, young middle-aged adults = YMA, 
old middle-aged adults = OMA, old adults = OA; abbr. used as subscripts) in order to 
simultaneously test age group differences with the same stimulus material. 
(2) A baseline measure is integrated to control for potential age group differences in 
emotional response prior to emotion induction.  
(3) Besides measuring situational fear, anger responses as well as shame responses are 
tested. 
(4) Four different levels of threat are implemented so as to be able to identify whether age 
group differences depend on the realized level of threat (intensity) or the specific 
scenario.  
(5) A question regarding importance of prevention of specific situation was included. 
This question relates to theoretical aspects that will be discussed in the fourth section 
of this dissertation. Description of results is included in this section because they are 
based on the same methodology. 
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Hypotheses 
 
Non-situational Fear of Crime 
Non-situational measures for fear of crime are included for comparability reasons. No age 
group differences are expected for the affective and cognitive component of fear of crime. 
In contrast, behavioral fear of crime is supposed to increase with each successive age 
group with the oldest age group indicating the highest behavioral fear and the youngest 
age group the lowest. Regarding the standard question, feelings of safety are assumed to 
decrease with each successive age group. 
Situational Fear of Crime 
Depending on whether only scenario is relevant in age differences or intensity level plays 
a role, different effects are hypothesized (see Figure 9). 
Scenario-Hypothesis: A 3-way interaction between threat level, age group and scenario is 
expected. While there is no age group difference at the lowest threat level, young adults 
report more fear than old adults with increasing threat level in one scenario (see ‘Scenario 
1’ in Figure 9), while the reversed pattern is displayed in another scenario (‘Scenario 2’). 
Intensity-Hypothesis: A 3-way interaction between threat level, age group and scenario is 
expected. While there is no age group difference at the lowest threat level, old adults 
exhibit more fear than young adults at a low level of threat, but young adults report more 
fear at high levels of threat. 
Middle-aged adults are assumed to be positioned between the young and the old age 
group in both hypotheses. 
Fear, Anger, and Shame 
Fear responses to the vignettes are hypothesized to be larger than anger and shame 
responses. 
Importance of Prevention 
 An interaction between threat level and age group is expected. The oldest age group is 
assumed to indicate the highest importance of preventing the described situation, while 
the youngest adults report the lowest importance. The two middle-aged age groups are 
assumed to adopt a position in between the other two age groups. The age group 
differences grow with each successive threat level being highest at the highest threat 
level. 
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Figure 9. Overview of different outcomes depending on scenario- versus intensity 
hypothesis. (Only young adults and old adults are displayed for lucidity; the middle-aged 
age groups are expected to be positioned between the young and old age group.) 
 
2.7.2. Method 
2.7.2.1. Participants 
Two approaches were chosen to recruit participants. In a first approach, participants were 
sampled with an online questionnaire (from June 2011 to May 2012) using Unipark. 
Participants were recruited either in a snowball-like system of personal contacts, via 
students who could earn extra course credits for recruiting participants, or by placing the 
link to the survey on internet platforms (e.g., www.elterntreff.de, www.seniorentreff.de, 
www.maennerboard.de, www.gofeminin.de). However, only small numbers of old 
participants could be recruited this way which is why printed versions of the survey were 
distributed in sport clubs, community meeting groups, and facilities for further education 
with a specific focus on old and middle-aged adults.  
Regarding the online sampling procedure, 1,611 clicks have been registered on the 
introductory page of the survey. Of those, 1,034 persons continued to page two that asked 
for the gender and age of participants and further demographic variables. Eight-hundred 
eighteen participants fitted the age group criteria of this study. Seventy-four percent of 
those completed the questionnaire at least up to the last vignette (ranging from 65% in the 
young middle-aged male group to 81% in the female sample of old middle-aged adults, 
see Table 7). I intended to sample 100 persons per age-by-gender group. The female 
young age group was oversampled to have a larger subject group for studying another 
research question implemented within the questionnaire but irrelevant in this context. For 
the present study, only the first 100 subjects in the data set who completed the 
questionnaire at least up to the last vignette were chosen as subsample for this specific 
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
5,0
5,5
6,0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Treat Level Treat Level Treat Level
Si
tu
at
io
n
al
 
Fe
ar
YA
OA
Scenario 
2
Intensity-
Hypothesis
Scenario-
Hypothesis
Scenario 
1
2. THE INDUCTION OF EMOTION  
 
73 
 
group.17 In the other age-by-gender groups only a fraction of the intended sample size 
could be reached with the online-approach (ranging from NOA, female = 6 to NYA, male = 73, see 
Table 7).18  
The print version of the questionnaire was completed by 140 participants. Because 
especially those groups were targeted that were hardly represented in the online sample, 
comparisons regarding differences in sample characteristics between the two methods 
cannot be conducted. 
 
Table 7  
Distribution of participants and percentage of completed questionnaires 
  YA YMA OMA OA Total 
  N % N % N % N % N % 
Online Male 73 74 24 65 35 70 17 71 149 71 
 Female 339 (100) 75 71 75 42 81 6 67 
458 
(219) 
75 
Print Male 1 100 11 100 7 100 29 100 48 100 
 Female 1 (0) 100 15 100 19 100 57 100 92 (91) 
100 
Total Male 74 74 35 73 42 74 46 87 197 76 
 Female 340 (100) 75 86 78 61 86 63 96 
550 
(310) 
79 
 Total 414 (174) 75 121 77 103 81 109 92 
747 
(507) 
78 
Note. YA = Young adults, YMA = Young middle-aged adults, OMA = Old middle-aged adults, OA = old 
adults. In parentheses is given the number of participants when only the subsample of female young adults 
is considered. 
 
In total, five hundred and seven adults were recruited that completed the survey at least 
up to the last vignette (young: 18 - 30 years, N = 174, Median = 23.0 years, 57.5% 
female; young middle-aged: 31 – 49 years, N = 121, Median = 37.0 years, 73.6% female; 
old middle-aged: 50 – 64 years, N = 103, Median = 57.0 years, 59.2% female; old: 65 - 84 
years, N = 109, Median = 73.0 years; 57.8% female; more sample descriptives can be 
seen in Table 8). Descriptively, the age groups differed most markedly in the percentage 
of females. In all but the oldest age group female participants were represented to a higher 
degree than in the population (about 49% in the age group of 18 to 64 year olds, from 65 
years: 57%, cf. Federal Office of Statistics, 2010).19 In the young middle-aged group 
female participants were significantly overrepresented, while the other age groups 
showed comparable distributions. Moreover, age groups differed with regard to living 
conditions. Old participants were less likely to live in a city with at least 100,000 
inhabitants. This variable showed no significant effect on the outcome variables. 
                                                 
17
 There were no significant differences with regard to life satisfaction and health between the subsample 
and the remaining young female sample that completed the questionnaire. However, the subsample was 
slightly older (Msubsample = 23.7 years vs. Mrest = 22.3 years). 
18
 Differences between completers and non-completers were calculated with regard to age, life satisfaction, 
well-being, and overall health for each age-by-gender group separately. There were no significant 
differences.   
19
 http://www.datenportal.bmbf.de/portal/K0.gus?rid=T0.12#T0.12 
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Regarding psychological variables, age was positively correlated with life satisfaction as 
measured in Study 1 and Study 2 (r = .15, p < .01). Moreover, the older participants were, 
the more they indicated higher general well-being (r = .23, p < .001) as measured with 
five items from the WHO-5 index (Brähler, Mühlan, Albani, & Schmidt, 2007) using a 4-
point scale ranging from at no time (1) to the whole time (4). In contrast, evaluations of 
health as measured in Study 2 decreased significantly with age (global health: r = -.22, 
flexibility: r = -.36, hearing: r = -.33, fitness: r = -.15, vision: r = -.31, ps < .001). 
 
Table 8  
Sample statistics including psychological variables 
 YA YMA OMA OA 
Age (Median) 23.0 37.0 57.0 73.0 
Age range 18 – 30 years 31 – 49 years 50 – 64 years 65 – 84 years 
Female 58% 71% 59% 58% 
Partner 54% 74% 79% 68% 
Highly educated° 82% 69% 80% 71% 
City inhabitants° 62% 57% 42% 41% 
Life satisfaction 4.51a 4.54a,b 4.75a,b 5.02b 
Well-being 3.72a 3.79a,b 4.08b,c 4.27c 
Health (overall) 4.01a 3.83a,b 3.75b 3.65b 
Flexibility 4.48 4.39 4.14 3.84 
Hearing 4.32 4.30 3.89 3.74 
Fitness 3.62 3.54 3.39 3.32 
Vision 4.37 4.30 3.91 3.90 
Note. Within any row, means with different superscripts are significantly different at p < .05 (only 
calculated for life satisfaction, well-being and overall health). °Highly educated: Participants younger than 
50 years had to complete college degrees (i.e., Abitur); participants older than 50 years had to complete 
higher level high school program (i.e., Realschule) (cf. Kunzmann & Richter, 2009); City: at least 100,000 
inhabitants. 
 
2.7.2.2. Measures and Material 
Non-situational Measures of Fear of Crime 
Regarding the affective and cognitive component, the same measures as in Study 1 and 2 
were used. The item-scale correlations for the affective component ranged between rit = 
.51 and rit = .74. For the cognitive component they ranged between rit = .53 and rit = .68. 
Internal consistency was  = .89 and  = .88, respectively.  
Precautious behavior was measured with eight items consisting of seven items from the 
scale in Study 2 and an additional item (“avoided unsupervised parking lots and decks”). 
The scale was shortened in order to include a variation of this scale without creating too 
much complexity. As in Study 1 and 2 and in comparable studies, subjects were asked to 
indicate, how often they took precautious measures in the last 12 months out of fear of 
crime on a 5-point scale ranging from never (1) to very often (5). Moreover, they were 
asked, how often they behaved that way out of other reasons in order to measure how 
often those behaviors are shown independent from fear. Moreover, this method puts more 
emphasis on the frequency of precautious behavior out of fear in contrast to other reasons. 
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Item-scale correlations for the behavioral fear component ranged between rit = .36 and rit 
= .69; internal consistency was satisfying with  = .81.  
Vignettes 
For each scenario of Study 2, the higher threatening version of the scenario was kept and 
served as threat level three in Study 3 (the car breakdown scenario had the lowest values 
in story relation in Study 1 and 2 and was excluded completely to shorten the study). 
Three new vignettes were constructed for each scenario with the goal of creating more 
pronounced differences in threat. Threat level one was created as representing the basic 
situation with minor threatening clues of threat if any. At each consecutive level at least 
one more clue that has shown to be threatening (see chapter 1.3) was added or replaced in 
contrast to the prior lower threat level (see Table A-2 for an overview of the scenarios and 
within scenario variations).  
Emotional Responses 
Emotional responses were assessed with a German translation of the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; German 
translation: Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996). The PANAS consists of 20 
items, 10 of which measure positive affect and the others measure negative affect. The 
PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) is an extended form of the standard version and 
includes the measurement of three broad categories: negative emotions (fear, hostility, 
guilt, and sadness), positive emotions (joviality, self-assurance, and attentiveness), and 
other affective states (shyness, fatigue, serenity, and surprise). In order to measure fear as 
in the PANAS-X, 2 items from this scale were added to the 20 items of the standard 
PANAS. Participants indicated the extent to which they felt those states when relating to 
the scenario on a 7-point scale ranging from not at all (1) to extremely (7). For the 
analysis of the present study, I am only interested in the fear measure consisting of the six 
items ‘afraid’ (‘ängstlich’), ‘frightened’ (‘furchtsam’), ‘nervous’ (‘nervös’), ‘jittery’ 
(‘unruhig’), ‘shaky’ (‘unsicher’), and ‘scared’ (‘verängstigt’). Four of these items 
mirrored items used in Study 1 and 2 (albeit two were phrased reversed). Internal 
consistency was high for all scenarios (Cronbach’s Home = .94, Cronbach’s Bus = .96, 
Cronbach’s Park = .96, and Cronbach’s Market = .94).  
Moreover, analyses were conducted with the two items upset (‘verärgert’) and ashamed 
(‘beschämt’). 
Prevention importance 
Participants were asked for each scenario how important it would be for them to avoid 
such a situation on a 4-point scale ranging from very unimportant (1) to very important 
(4). 
 
2.7.2.3. Design and Procedure 
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first part asked for basic demographic 
information, health questions, and the standard question. The second part of the 
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questionnaire included the four vignettes. Before reading the vignettes, subjects were 
asked to indicate how they feel at the moment using the PANAS. The vignette-reading 
part was introduced by stating that the participants were going to read short descriptions 
of a fictional scenario that could happen in real life and where people respond differently. 
They were asked to try to imagine themselves in the scenario as well as they can and 
notice how they would feel. Directly after reading the scenario subjects were asked to 
answer some questions regarding their feelings and judgments. Participants were 
randomly administered to one of the four intensity levels of the vignette scenarios 
stratified by age group and gender. In contrast to Study 1 and 2, each participant read all 
scenarios belonging to only one intensity level. In the third part of the questionnaire, 
subjects answered questions regarding the non-situational measures of fear of crime 
(affective, cognitive, and behavioral component of fear of crime).  
The home scenario was always presented as first vignette. Which scenario was presented 
as second, third, and fourth vignette was randomly administered by the program in the 
online approach and approximately equally distributed across the age-by-gender groups. 
The printed version only had two variants. Either the park scenario was presented as 
second or fourth vignette or the bus stop scenario, respectively. Order of vignettes did not 
show any effects on the outcomes.   
 
 
2.7.2.4. Data Analyses 
The analysis of the non-situational measures of fear of crime involved four parallel 
univariate analyses of variance with gender (female vs. male) and age (young vs. young 
middle-aged vs. old middle-aged vs. old adults) as between-subject factors. Significant 
effects were followed-up with multiple comparisons with Bonferroni-corrected 
significance levels. 
The analysis of the vignettes consisted of four 4 × 2 × 4 × 2 × 3 multivariate repeated 
measures analyses of variance (MANOVA) for each vignette. Dependent variables were 
self-reported emotions fear, anger, and shame at baseline and after reading the vignette. 
Between-subject factors were age (young vs. young middle-aged vs. old middle-aged vs. 
old adults), gender (male vs. female), and intensity level of threat (ranging from one to 
four). F values were computed on the basis of Pillai’s trace as this is assumed to be robust 
against unequal and small cell sizes as well as violations of homogeneity of covariances 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). To isolate changes in particular outcomes, each overall 
MANOVA was followed by parallel univariate repeated measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs). Planned orthogonal contrasts (Helmert) were tested when examining 
differences between different levels of a factor (e.g., four age groups) or different 
outcome variables (e.g., three different emotion measures). In Helmert contrasts the mean 
of one level of the variable or outcome variable is compared with the mean of the 
consecutive levels or other outcome variables combined. The partial eta squares are 
reported for each significant effect. Univariate follow-up ANOVAs were conducted on 
difference values and post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni) were tested to detect which 
groups and threat levels differed significantly from each other. 
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In order to test for the intensity- and scenario-hypothesis, a 4 × 2 × 4 × 4 MANOVA with 
repeated measures on fear in the four different scenarios was calculated. Age (young vs. 
young middle-aged vs. old middle-aged vs. old adults), gender (male vs. female), and 
threat level (ranging from one to four) were between-subject factors. 
Finally, I conducted a 4 × 2 × 4 × 4 MANOVA with repeated measures on importance of 
preventing the situation for the four scenarios with age (young vs. young middle-aged vs. 
old middle-aged vs. old adults), gender (male vs. female), and threat level (ranging from 
one to four) as between-subject factors. 
 
2.7.3. Results 
2.7.3.1. Non-situational Measures of Fear of Crime 
I conducted four 4 (age) × 2 (gender) analyses of variance with the affective, cognitive, 
and behavioral component of fear of crime as well as the standard question as dependent 
variables. As can be seen in Table 9, there was a main effect of age group in the affective 
component [F(3, 488) = 3.43, p < .05, ² = .02], the behavioral component [F(3, 488) = 
11.63, p < .001, ² = .07], and the standard question [F(3, 488) = 4.11, p < .01, ² = .03]. 
The main effect of age group in the standard question was qualified by a small  
interaction with gender [F(3, 488) = 3.62, p < .05, ² = .02]. Post-hoc multiple 
comparisons of age group differences with Bonferroni-corrected significance levels 
revealed that only the oldest age group differed significantly from the youngest (MYA = 
1.93 > MOA = 1.70, p < .05) in the affective component indicating that old adults 
experienced fear of crime significantly less often. Regarding the behavioral component, 
only the oldest age group differed significantly from the other age groups (MYA = 2.16 = 
MYMA = 2.09 = MOMA = 2.26 > MOA = 2.67, ps < .001). Accordingly, only the oldest age 
group behaved significantly more precautious. This stands in contrast to Study 1 where 
the old middle-aged group also differed significantly from the young age group.  
Concerning the interaction effect between age group and gender on the standard question, 
follow-up analyses showed that only the young male age group differed significantly 
from the oldest male age group (MYA = 1.56 < MOA = 1.93, p < .01) indicating that the old 
age group felt less safe. Contrasting, female young and old participants differed 
significantly from young middle-aged adults (MYA = 2.23 > MYMA = 1.96 = MOMA = 2.07 < 
MOA = 2.35, ps < .05). However, the oldest age group reported the lowest feelings of 
safety. 
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Table 9  
Means and standard deviations for non-situational fear-of-crime measures 
  YA YMA OMA OA 
Measure Gender M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Affective Male 1.85a .62 1.74a,b .70 1.79a,b .60 1.64b .43 
 Female 2.01a .64 1.92a,b .67 1.71a,b .66 1.75b .68 
Cognitive Male 1.50a .40 1.56a .44 1.60a .31 1.66a .34 
 Female 1.69b .44 1.71b .43 1.57b .44 1.69b .48 
Behavioral Male 1.86a .73 1.78a .69 2.18a .68 2.36b .63 
 Female 2.46c .75 2.40c .93 2.34c .82 2.98d .89 
Standard Male 1.56a .55 1.83a,b .62 1.66a,b .57 1.93b .70 
 Female 2.23c .70 1.96a,d .61 2.07c,d .76 2.35c .63 
Note. Within any two rows belonging to one measure, means with different superscripts are significantly 
different at p < .05.   
 
2.7.3.2. Situational Fear of Crime 
The first analyses concern the three different outcomes (fear, anger, shame) for each 
scenario separately in comparing baseline responses with responses to the scenario in 
dependence of threat level including age and gender as factors. These analyses give a first 
overview and are followed up by analyses regarding differences between the different 
measures to test for the hypotheses that fear responses to the vignettes are more 
pronounced than anger responses and those are more pronounced than shame responses. 
Afterwards analyses focus on the fear response. 
MANOVA 
The four overall MANOVAs for the self-reported emotions revealed main effects for age 
[Home: F(3, 457) = 8.53, p < .001, ² = .05; Bus Stop: F(3, 444) = 7.72, p < .001, ² = 
.05; Park: F(3, 455) = 6.70, p < .001, ² = .04; Market: F(3, 456) = 10.28, p < .001, ² = 
.06], vignette [Home: F(1, 457) = 699.36, p < .001, ² = .61; Bus Stop: F(1, 444) = 
686.35, p < .001, ² = .61; Park: F(1, 455) = 492.46, p < .001, ² = .52; Market: F(1, 456) 
= 102.53, p < .001, ² = 0.18], as well as threat level [Home: F(3, 457) = 7.25, p < .001, 
² = .05; Bus Stop: F(3, 444) = 6.69, p < .001, ² = .04; Park: F(3, 455) = 12.40, p < .001, 
² = .08; Market: F(3, 456) = 50.04, p < .001, ² = .25] for each scenario. Importantly, the 
effect of vignette, i.e., differences between reported emotions at baseline and after reading 
the vignette, depended on the different levels of threat as indicated in an interaction 
effect of vignette with threat level [Home: F(3, 457) = 4.69, p < .01, ² = .03; Bus Stop: 
F(3, 444) = 5.51, p < .01, ² = .04; Park: F(3, 455) = 9.93, p < .001, ² = .06; Market: F(3, 
456) = 65.02, p < .001, ² =.30]. Moreover, the effect of vignette was qualified by an 
interaction with gender [Home: F(1, 457) = 14.76, p < .001, ² = .03; Bus Stop: F(1, 444) 
= 7.74, p < .01, ² = .02; Park: F(1, 455) = 17.77, p < .001, ² = .04; Market: F(1, 456) = 
3.69, p = .055, ² = .01].  
Additionally, there were large main effects of emotion [Home: F(2, 456) = 789.94, p < 
.001, ² = .78; Bus Stop: F(2, 443) = 653.16, p < .001, ² = .75; Park: F(2, 454) = 585.95, 
p < .001, ² = .72; Market: F(2, 455) = 236.00, p < .001, ² =.51]. Differences between 
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baseline and scenario depended on the self-reported emotion measure, as signified by an 
interaction between vignette and emotion [Home: F(2, 456) = 582.92, p < .001, ² = 
.72; Bus Stop: F(2, 443) = 388.77, p < .001, ² = .64; Park: F(2, 454) = 365.64, p < .001, 
² = .62; Market: F(2, 455) = 57.58, p < .001, ² = .20]. This interaction effect was further 
qualified by a small interaction effect of emotion with threat level for each vignette 
(Vignette × Emotion × Threat Level, see Table B-1). This three-way interaction means 
that differences between baseline and response to the scenario varied in dependence of 
the threat level and this was different for the specific emotional measure.  
Differences between emotional response measures were also qualified for three vignettes 
through an interaction effect of emotion with age [Home: F(6, 914) = 7.12, p < .001, ² 
= .05; Park: F(6, 908) = 2.16, p < .05, ² = .01; Market: F(6, 910) = 2.87, p < .05, ² =.02] 
indicating that differences between reported emotions were dependent on the age of the 
participant.  
Furthermore, there were some more 4-way interaction effects specific for only one or two 
vignettes. The details will be studied when focusing on the different vignettes (see Table 
B-1 for full list of F-values). 
 
Different Emotions 
As seen in the previous analyses, there are meaningful differences between the three 
emotional responses to the vignettes. Planned Helmert contrasts with fear as reference 
variable revealed that mean ratings for self-reported fear were significantly larger than the 
ratings for the mean of anger and shame together and that the mean rating for anger was 
significantly larger than that for shame (all contrasts were significant at p < .001; Table 
10) for means and standard deviations of fear responses; Table B-4 and Table B-5 for 
means and standard deviations of anger and shame responses). This demonstrates that 
fear was the strongest emotional response to the vignettes given the three examined 
responses, followed by anger (see Figure 10 exemplarily for the differences between 
emotional responses). As found in the overall MANOVAs, however, this effect was 
qualified by interactions with age in three vignettes. Moreover, there were interactions 
with gender, with threat level, vignette, and the interaction between threat level and 
vignette. Not all of these interactions are followed up here, as many of them are rather 
small and need to be replicated in future studies. 
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Figure 10. Comparison of different emotional responses between baseline and flat 
scenario for different threat levels. 
 
Furthermore, differences between self-reported emotions were dependent on vignette (all 
contrasts but one were significant at least at p < .05, one was only marginally significant). 
As expected, the difference between self-reported fear and the mean of anger and shame 
after responding to the scenarios was much more pronounced than at baseline (e.g., 
Diffbaseline = 0.45 vs. DiffHome = 2.31). Similarly, the difference between anger and shame 
was low at baseline (Diffbaseline = 0.38) in contrast to responding to the scenario (ranging 
from DiffPark = 1.41 to DiffBus Stop = 2.20). This lends further support for the assumption that 
the vignettes are sensitive to fear. Concurring, the interaction effect between emotions, 
vignette, and threat level showed that the difference between fear and the mean of anger 
and shame was more pronounced after responding to vignettes of threat level two to four 
in contrast to the lowest threat level (all contrasts were significant at p < .001).   
Interaction of Helmert contrast effects showed that age influenced the difference between 
fear and the mean of anger and shame in the home, bus stop, and market vignette (ps < 
.05). Young adults had the largest difference between fear and the other two emotions, 
whereas the oldest age group had the lowest difference. As will be seen, this is due to 
lower fear responses in the older age group. Moreover, the age groups differed with 
regard to the size of the difference between anger and shame. The oldest age group had 
the lowest difference, followed by the youngest age group. The other two age groups had 
higher differences. In general, however, anger was rated higher than shame in all age 
groups.  
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Fear 
Success of vignettes in eliciting fear at different threat levels 
As could already be seen from the MANOVAs, follow-up ANOVAs with repeated 
measures on vignette (baseline vs. scenario) for all scenarios revealed significant effects 
for vignette (for F-values see Table B-2). For all scenarios, self-reported fear was larger 
after reading the scenario than at baseline (Mbaseline = 1.94 vs. MHome = 4.71 vs. MBus Stop = 
4.67 vs. MPark = 4.55 vs. MMarket = 2.60). Beside a main effect of threat level for all 
scenarios, there was an interaction effect between vignette and threat level [Home: F(3, 
468) = 6.29, p < .001, ² = .04; Bus Stop: F(3, 457) = 8.71, p < .001, ² = .05; Park: F(3, 
468) = 6.66, p < .001, ² = .04; Market: F(3, 465) = 40.66, p < .001, ² = .21] indicating 
that differences between baseline and vignette were dependent on threat level.  
 
Table 10 depicts mean levels and standard deviations of situational fear separately for 
baseline, scenario, age, and threat level. Post-hoc analyses (Bonferroni) on the difference 
values (fear response to scenario - baseline) for each vignette showed for the home and 
park vignette that fear responses increased significantly less at threat level one compared 
with all other threat levels (Home: Difflevel 1 = 2.23 < Difflevel 2 = 2.84 = Difflevel 3 = 2.82 = 
Difflevel 4 = 3.20; Park: Difflevel 1 = 2.00 < Difflevel 2 = 2.67 = Difflevel 3 = 2.69 = Difflevel 4 = 3.10; 
ps < .01). The other threat levels did not significantly differ from each other. In contrast, 
in the bus stop vignette fear responses did not differ significantly between level one and 
two, only marginally between one and three (p = .06), and significantly between threat 
level one and four (p < .001). Level two and level three did not differ significantly from 
each other but from level four (ps < .01; Difflevel 1 = 2.29, Difflevel 2 = 2.49, Difflevel 3 = 2.74, 
and Difflevel 4 = 3.46). Descriptively, fear responses increased from one threat level to the 
next. In the market vignette, all threat levels differed significantly from each other (Difflevel 
1 = -0.28, Difflevel 2 = 0.14, Difflevel 3 = 0.89, and Difflevel 4 = 1.90; ps < .001; level 1 vs. 2: p = 
.09) with the largest increase at the highest threat level. Accordingly, fear responses to the 
vignettes have been elicited; however, the moderating effect of threat level played out 
slightly different for the four scenarios, which has to do with further interaction effects 
detailed below. In any case, threat level four evoked more fear than level one. 
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Age Differences in Subjective Reactivity 
For all vignettes a main effect of age group was obtained [Home: F(3, 468) = 17.23, p < 
.001, ² = .10; Bus Stop: F(3, 457) = 6.98, p < .001, ² = .04; Park: F(3, 468) = 8.91 p < 
.001, ² = .05; Market: F(3, 465) = 9.08, p < .001, ² = .06]. Post-hoc analyses 
(Bonferroni) for the home, park, and bus stop scenario revealed that the young and young 
middle-aged group reported significantly more fear than the old middle-aged adults and 
old adults (all ps < .01). Slightly different results were found for the market scenario. The 
old middle-aged group had the lowest fear responses, which is why their responses were 
significantly lower than those of young and young middle-aged adults (ps < .001). The 
oldest age group was positioned in-between and did not differ significantly from any 
other age group. Conducting an ANOVA for fear at baseline showed a significant age 
effect [F(3, 472) = 5.67, p < .01, ² = .04]. Post-hoc analyses demonstrated that the old 
middle-aged subject group differed significantly from the youngest age group (p < .01) 
and was marginally significant from the young middle-aged group (p = .08). This age 
group reported lower fear levels already at baseline. 
 
 
Figure 11. Fear difference values between home scenario and baseline for 
each threat level for age groups separately. 
 
 
There was only one interaction effect obtained between vignette and age for the home 
scenario [F(3, 468) = 4.82, p < .01, ² = .03]. This interaction effect indicated that the 
increase in fear from baseline to vignette response differed between the age groups with 
the youngest age group exhibiting the highest increase and the oldest age group showing 
the lowest increase (DiffYA = 3.10, DiffYMA = 2.92, DiffOMA = 2.73, and DiffOA = 2.33). The 
middle-aged groups reported fear responses placed between young and old adults. This 
strengthens the results of Study 1 and 2 as it points out that differences between the age 
groups do not only reflect already existing differences at baseline but are age-related 
differences in response to the described situation (see Figure 11; interaction with threat 
level is not significant).  
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Regarding the park vignette, there was a 4-way interaction between vignette, threat level, 
age, and gender [F(9, 468) = 2.02, p < .05, ² = .04]. While the interaction effect between 
vignette and threat level showed that only the increase in fear at the highest threat level 
differed significantly from all other threat levels, the 4-way interaction demonstrated that 
the pattern of increases between baseline and scenario differed between gender, age 
group, and threat level. As depicted in Figure 12, female old middle-aged and female old 
adults showed less increase in fear at threat level two and three (and the old age group 
also at level four) than the two other age groups. In contrast, male young participants 
reported less increase in fear at threat level two and four but slightly more at level three 
than the two oldest age groups. The finding for female participants is in accord with the 
results from Study 1 and Study 2 and suggests that age differences were not the result of 
already existing differences at baseline but are reflective of differences in response to 
threatening situations. 
 
 
Figure 12. Fear difference values between park scenario and baseline for 
each threat level for age groups and gender separately. 
 
Differences Between Age Group Differences: Intensity versus Scenario Hypothesis 
One further question resulting from Study 1 and 2 was whether differences between age 
group differences depended on the intensity level of threat or on the specific situation or a 
combination of both. I conducted a 4 × 2 × 4 × 4 MANOVA with repeated measures on 
the difference values of fear (scenario - baseline) for the four different scenarios with age, 
gender, and threat level as between-subject factors. The analysis showed a significant 
effect of scenario, F(3, 451) = 286.23, p < .01, ² = .66. This means that mean increases 
in fear were different for the scenarios. This effect was moderated by interactions with 
threat level, F(9, 1359) = 5.76, p < .001, ² = .04, and, more importantly, with age, F(9, 
1359) = 3.24, p < .01, ² = .02. There was no significant interaction between threat level 
and age or scenario, threat level, and age. This indicates that differences between the age 
groups in the different scenarios as described above are a function of the specific 
situation, i.e., there are differences in the size of age group differences in response to the 
scenarios that vary depending on the situation.  
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As displayed in Figure 13, the difference between the oldest and youngest age group was 
higher in the home and park scenario than in the bus stop and market scenario. Overall, 
this finding corroborates the results of Study 1 and 2. While the analyses above indicated 
that there was a main effect of age across all scenarios, this effect was only qualified in 
the home and park scenario suggesting age differences in response to these situations. In 
contrast, there was a small interaction effect between age and threat level for the bus stop 
scenario in Study 2. This result could not be replicated in the present study. Concurring to 
the results in Study 1 and 2, there was no age-related difference in response to the market 
scenario. 
 
 
Figure 13. Comparison of fear responses separately for scenario, and age 
group. 
 
 
Gender Differences in Subjective Reactivity of Fear 
Main effects for gender were obtained for the home, bus stop, and park scenario (see 
Table B-2 for F-values). Those gender effects were qualified by an interaction with 
vignette, signifying that gender differences were different at baseline in contrast to 
vignette responses. An ANOVA for fear at baseline showed no significant gender 
differences. In contrast, ANOVAs with the difference values between baseline and 
vignette response as dependent variable revealed significant gender effects for all 
scenarios with female participants reporting more increase in fear than male participants. 
This effect was qualified by an interaction with threat level in the bus stop and market 
scenario and was even further qualified by an interaction with threat level and age in the 
park scenario (see above). Female and male participants differed in the differences 
between the threat levels (e.g., difference between level one and level four for the market 
scenario: male: Diff = 1.66 vs. female: Diff = 2.69). 
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2.7.3.3. Importance of Prevention 
An alternative theoretical approach is tested in this chapter. It was hypothesized that the 
oldest age group indicates more importance of prevention for each scenario than the 
youngest age group, while the middle-aged groups are positioned in-between. The age 
differences were assumed to increase with each successive threat level, thus, being 
reflected in an interaction between age group and threat level. 
I conducted a 4 × 2 × 4 × 4 MANOVA with repeated measures on importance of 
preventing the situation for the four scenarios with age, gender, and threat level as 
between-subject factors. The analysis showed a main effect of scenario [F(3,437) = 80.81, 
p < .001, ² = .36], which indicates that the importance to prevent the described situation 
differed between the specific scenarios. Moreover, I obtained a main effect of age 
[F(3,439) = 10.14, p < .001, ² = .07] that indicated that the importance of prevention 
increased with age (MYA = 2.54 vs. MYMA = 2.72 vs. MOMA = 2.67 vs. MOA = 3.00), albeit 
not linearly. Finally, threat level had an effect on prevention importance as well [F(3,439) 
= 31.54, p < .001, ² = .18]. 
The main effect of scenario was qualified by interactions with age [F(9,1317) = 2.04, p < 
.05, ² = .01], gender [F(3,437) = 80.81, p < .001, ² = .08], and threat level [F(9,1317) = 
6.99, p < .001, ² = .05], and by an interaction with age and gender [F(9,1317) = 2.04, p < 
.05, ² = .01]. The hypothesized 2-way interaction between threat level and age group was 
not significant, F(9,439) = 1.56, p = .13.  
Post-hoc analyses revealed that the lowest importance of prevention was reported for 
scenarios at the lowest threat level, being significantly lower than all other threat levels 
(ps < .001). Prevention importance was the highest at the highest threat level, being 
significantly different from all other vignettes (ps < .001). The two medium levels did not 
differ significantly from each other (MLevel 1 = 2.30 vs. MLevel 2 = 2.64 vs. MLevel 3 = 2.83 vs. 
MLevel 4 = 3.16). 
Follow-up ANOVAs separately for each vignette with importance of prevention as 
dependent variable showed a main effect of age for each vignette that was only qualified 
by threat level in the home scenario [F(3,471) = 8.19, p < .001, ² = .05, Table 11]. Post-
hoc analyses of age group comparisons revealed that the oldest age group reported the 
highest importance of prevention and differed significantly from all other age groups in 
the market vignette (ps < .001), from the youngest and old middle-aged age group in the 
bus stop vignette (ps < .05), and only from the young adults in the park vignette (p < .05). 
Accordingly, while old adults indicated consistently more importance of prevention than 
the youngest age group, middle-aged adults were more similar to the old age group in 
some scenarios and more similar to the young age group in others. Regarding the 
interaction effect between age and threat level in the home scenario, young and young 
middle-aged adults had a greater increase in prevention importance from threat level one 
to level four than both old age groups (Table 11). 
There was also a main effect of gender [F(1,439) = 34.30, p < .001, ² = .07] showing 
that female participants placed more importance on preventing the described situations 
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than male participants (MMale = 2.55 vs. MFemale = 2.92). As was denoted by the interaction 
between scenario and gender in the MANOVA, there were main effects of gender for all 
but the bus stop vignette (ps < .001). Moreover, differences between threat levels varied 
as a function of the specific scenario, as indicated by the interaction between scenario and 
threat level. Threat level was significant in all scenarios, but was qualified by an 
interaction with age in the home scenario (see above). Post-hoc analyses revealed that 
only prevention importance stated at the highest threat level differed significantly from all 
other threat levels for the bus stop and market vignette (ps < .0019. In contrast, in the 
park vignette the least prevention importance was stated at threat level one, being 
significantly different from all other threat levels (ps < .001).  
 
Table 11  
Means, standard errors, and effects sizes for importance of prevention separately for 
scenario, age group, and threat level 
Mean  Standard Error  Effect Size 
Threat 
Level Y YMA OMA O  Y YMA OMA O  
Threat 
Level Age T ×A 
Home 
1 2.07 2.57 3.03 3.08  .16 .18 .16 .16  
.06*** .05*** .05* 
2 2.82 2.82 2.67 2.99  .12 .17 .19 .17  
3 2.65 2.96 2.92 3.35  .13 .16 .16 .16  
4 3.13 3.28 3.39 3.28  .13 .16 .18 .18 
 
Mean 2.67 2.91 3.00 3.18  .07 .09 .09 .08     
 
 
    
 
    
    
Bus 
Stop 
1 2.63 2.42 2.76 2.88  .16 .19 .17 .17  
.04*** .03* n.s. 
2 2.78 3.04 2.48 3.14  .12 .18 .2 .18  
3 2.74 3.06 2.67 3.12  .13 .17 .17 .17  
4 3.05 3.20 3.18 3.42  .15 .17 .19 .19 
 
Mean 2.80 2.93 2.77 3.14  .07 .09 .09 .09     
 
 
    
 
    
    
Park 
1 2.10 2.38 2.73 2.57  .16 .19 .16 .17  
.08*** .03** n.s. 
2 2.91 2.95 2.58 3.09  .12 .17 .21 .17  
3 2.79 2.99 2.92 3.35  .13 .17 .17 .16  
4 3.04 3.07 3.22 3.38  .13 .17 .18 .18 
 
Mean 2.71 2.85 2.86 3.10  .07 .09 .09 .09     
 
 
    
 
    
    
Mar-
ket 
1 1.10 1.36 1.47 1.96  .17 .19 .17 .18  
.24*** .08*** n.s. 
2 1.76 2.22 1.88 2.45  .13 .18 .21 .18  
3 2.16 2.39 2.41 2.89  .13 .17 .17 .17  
4 2.74 2.89 2.73 3.33  .14 .17 .19 .19 
 
Mean 1.94 2.21 2.12 2.66  .07 .09 .09 .09     
Note. Effects for scenarios from ANOVA. A = Age, T = Threat Level. 
* p < .05. *** p < .001. 
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2.7.4. Discussion 
Study 3 was conducted to provide answers to some open questions from Studies 1 and 2. 
A baseline measure was included in Study 3 to test whether differences between the age 
groups prior to responding to the vignettes existed. The analyses showed that particularly 
the older middle-aged adults indicated less fear than both younger age groups, while the 
old adult age group reported a fear level between that of the older middle-aged and the 
younger age groups. Differences between the age groups in fear responses to the 
scenarios could be partly attributed to these baseline differences. However, there was an 
interaction between age group and vignette for the home scenario. This interaction 
replicated the finding of Study 1 and 2. The increase from baseline to fear response to the 
scenario was larger for the young adult age groups than for the older middle-aged and old 
age group. This suggests that age group differences regarding this scenario were 
reflecting differences in fear responses. The 3-way interaction between age group, 
vignette, and threat level was not significant. Descriptively, age-related differences in 
responses to the lowest and highest threat level were smaller.  
Besides the home scenario, there was a 4-way interaction obtained between age group, 
vignette, threat level, and gender. Overall, female participants replicated the finding of 
Study 1 and 2, in which younger adults indicated more fear concerning the park scenario 
than older middle-aged and old adults with regard to the intermediate threat levels. Male 
participants did not show the same pattern of results. Noticeable in this regard is the male 
young middle-aged adult group. However, this age group had the smallest cell size, which 
could result in distorted estimates, although adjustment procedures were taken. The lack 
of an interaction between gender and age group with larger cell sizes in Study 1 and 2 
suggests that the interaction in Study 3 may be due to this factor rather than reflecting true 
differences between female and male participants dependent on age. In sum, these results 
lend support for the finding that there is no general increase in situational fear with age; 
thus, there is no age-related increase in dispositional fear. In contrast, in some situations 
young adults may even experience more fear of crime than old adults. 
A further aim of Study 3 was to examine differences between various age groups within 
one study. Unfortunately, the goal of obtaining an appropriate sample size was not 
achieved for all age-by-gender groups. This is particularly problematic for interactions 
involving more than two variables, because spurious effects can be obtained, on the one 
hand, but power could be too low to detect true effects, on the other hand. Replicating the 
results of Study 1 and 2 lends some credence to the findings in the present study. 
However, especially 4-way interactions should be treated as preliminary and in need of 
replication. Based on the present findings, there are indications that older middle-aged 
adults rather resemble old adults in their responses, while younger middle-aged adults 
seem to be more similar to young adults. Hence, if there are age-related differences, they 
do not seem to reflect linear changes. Averaging across the middle-aged adult group may 
not do justice to underlying differences. In general, however, there were only small age-
related differences in situational fear. 
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In relation to age group differences was the question, whether older adults exhibit more 
fear of crime than young adults at lower levels of threat, while young adults show more 
fear at higher levels of threat. Alternatively, age differences may be a function of the 
specific scenario. In Study 3, different levels of threat could be realized for each vignette. 
The findings suggest that old adults do not generally report more fear at lower levels of 
threat than young adults and vice versa at higher levels of threat. Yet, it does not seem to 
be the case that young adults generally report more fear than old adults in some scenarios, 
while old adults indicate more fear in other scenarios. There are indications that young 
adults reliably state more fear than older adults in two scenarios (home and park), while 
there are no age differences in other scenarios.  
In general, it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish the influence of threat level from 
scenario. Threat level itself is not an objective independent variable but is deduced from 
the intensity of fear response. The intensity of threat is derived from the meaning 
individuals attach to specific markers of threat. In this sense, every level of threat 
constitutes a new situation, which can be perceived differently threatening. As Frijda 
(2010) and Koskela and Pain (2000) emphasized, situations receive their threatening 
status from subjective attribution of meaning. For example, daylight versus darkness may 
have a different meaning depending on other situational factors. When being out in a 
deserted countryside, daylight versus darkness may play a lesser role than when being in 
a deserted park that is known for drug crimes. Being accompanied by your partner may be 
perceived as supporting or hindering depending on the perceived fitness of the partner. In 
this regard, every additional “signal” of threat within the scenarios only adds more 
intensity of fear if it is perceived as threatening. Therefore, each level of threat within 
each scenario constitutes a new situation that could be differently perceived as threatening 
by each age group. That old adults respond with less or equal fear to the threat levels of 
the different scenarios as young adults suggests that they perceive the same stimuli as 
threatening (and sometimes as less threatening). Moreover, comparable maximum 
intensity of fear responses implies that older adults are generally able to respond similarly 
fearful. Confronting the different age groups with a reasonable number of everyday life 
situations that could be related to crime-threat allows drawing conclusions about general 
subjective reactivity in fear of crime. Here, the findings of the three studies suggest that 
older adults do not respond with more situational fear. If anything, they show less fear 
than young adults.   
Another aspect that was examined in Study 3 refers to different emotional responses to 
potentially crime-related situations. Ditton et al. (1999) and Jackson (2009) remarked that 
fear is only one possible response to crime, but that anger was a plausible if not more 
likely emotional response. With regard to trauma, feeling ashamed has been researched as 
well. The present study demonstrated that fear responses to the described scenarios were 
larger than anger and shame responses and that anger responses were more pronounced 
than feeling ashamed. Moreover, interactions between threat levels and differences 
between baseline and fear response to the scenario indicated that fear responses varied as 
a function of induced threat. These findings suggest that responding with fear is a more 
probable response than anger or shame when being confronted with impending personal 
threat. Anger responses may be more relevant with regard to vicarious victimization. 
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Shame responses were even less pronounced than anger responses. This indicates that 
feeling ashamed is probably rather a response to actual victimization in contrast to 
imagined or anticipated threat. The difference between anger and shame responses may 
result from being reminded by the scenarios that such threatening situations actually 
happen in real life, if not to oneself than potentially to others. In this sense, the scenarios 
may to some extent function as reminders of vicarious victimization, which could be 
more related to anger responses. 
  
2.8. General Discussion of Studies 1 to 3 
The aim of the first three studies was to assess the extent that increasingly precautious 
behaviors observed with age were the expression of an age-related increase in 
dispositional fear. Dispositional fear is understood as inter-individual differences in the 
propensity to experience situational fear of crime. Consequently, an age-related increase 
in dispositional fear should be visible in an age-related increase in situational fear across 
various situations. This age-related increase in situational fear was hypothesized to be 
dependent on an age-related increase in physical vulnerability. It was argued that with 
age, the increased intensity of situational fear across various situations, i.e., dispositional 
fear, is associated with an increase in preventive behavior in order to avoid such 
situations. If this was the case, this could explain, why older adults report similar 
frequencies of experiencing fear of crime (affective component of fear of crime) and 
assess equal probabilities of victimization risk (cognitive component) as young adults. 
To assess the hypothesis that older adults are more likely to experience situational fear of 
crime across various situations, fear was evoked using the vignette technique. This 
represents an extension on previous criminological research that experimentally studied 
fear of crime as more contextualized and self-relevant threat scenarios were utilized. It 
also fills a gap in emotion developmental psychology in that fear was focused on a 
specific object (i.e., threat from criminal offenses) and a number of various situations 
were used.  
In the present studies a relatively stable pattern of mixed results was obtained. In contrast 
to hypothesis, young adults reported more situational fear in the home scenario than older 
middle-aged and old adults. There were also indications that young adults exhibited more 
fear than older middle-aged and old adults in the park scenario; however, this finding was 
less reliable as it was only descriptively found in Study 2 and only obtained for female 
participants in Study 3. In contrast, old adults only indicated more fear than young adults 
in Study 2 given a lower threat level in the car breakdown scenario and a higher threat 
level in the bus stop scenario. While the car breakdown scenario was not used in Study 2, 
the finding of the bus stop scenario could not be replicated in Study 3. The higher threat 
level version of each vignette of Study 2 was retained as threat level three in Study 3. 
Descriptively, young adults reported more fear at this level than all other age groups. 
Consequently, the lack of replicating the finding of Study 2 is probably not due to low 
power of Study 3. In sum, it appears that there is no general increase of situational fear of 
crime with age. In contrast, the results corroborate recent findings of developmental 
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emotion psychology research in that age differences in emotional reactivity or the lack of 
differences depend on the specific stimulus material used (e.g., Kunzmann & Grühn, 
2005; Kunzmann & Richter, 2009; Teachman & Gordon, 2009). While the finding that 
older adults also report more fear of crime in some situations is less reliable than the 
finding that young adults are more fearful in certain situations, the results support the 
observation that emotional responses are stimulus specific. Conclusions drawn from the 
employment of a set of stimuli may not generalize to another set of stimuli. This also 
implies that the opposing results observed in the studies of Fisher et al. (2004) and Ziegler 
and Mitchell (2003) may not have occurred by chance but may be attributable to the 
specific stimuli that were used. This result highlights the importance of embedding 
emotional stimuli within contexts that are relevant for both age groups in future studies. 
In this regard it is important to question what those situations entail for different age 
groups. The specification of fear of crime as a general construct does not reflect age-
related differences in terms of the perception of the situation and resultant situational fear.  
In the present studies, situations were selected that were equally applicable to young and 
old adults in terms of their general accessibility (accordingly, young and old adults did 
not differ in being able to relate to the story). This was based on the assumption that there 
is a general age-related increase in situational fear with regard to crime. Given that 
findings did not support this assumption, I can only speculate about what contributed to 
the age-related differences in the scenarios. Potentially, the age groups differed in their 
interpretation of the implied crime or its specific potential to harm. If this was the case, 
this would reflect differences in the perception of threat in those situations, i.e., 
differences in response to situational provocation, which varies between age groups 
dependent on the specific situation. The question remains, why they interpret the same 
situation differently. Similarly, the same potential crime could have been perceived but 
differently evaluated as threatening reflecting differences in the evaluation of the 
propensity that the implied crime would be carried out in real life; for example, older 
adults could tax the probability higher that they will be verbally attacked by youths, 
whereas they judge their chances of being physically attacked lower. Furthermore, age 
differences in the home scenario could reflect younger adults’ comparatively novel 
experience of not living with their parents anymore or worse security equipment (see 
below). Moreover, the two situations that evoked more threat in younger adults (park, 
home) could have activated scripts (e.g., known from movies) that focus on young people 
as potential victims. Although both age groups indicated the same extent of being able to 
relate to the stories, younger participants could have answered more in line with the 
expected script that is associated with fear. Think-aloud protocols and open follow-up 
questions on the scenarios may give further insight in the underlying mechanisms. At any 
rate, the addressed accounts reflect context-specific threat interpretations and underline a 
lack of a general age-related increase in situational fear of crime. Based on these findings, 
future studies need to investigate systematically which factors contribute to constructing 
threat in different age groups and what are the factors influencing this change.  
One such factor concerned the relation between an age-related increase in dispositional 
fear and perceptions of physical vulnerability. The findings of Study 2 demonstrated that 
perception of physical vulnerability was related to subjective health. But while subjective 
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health had a large correlation with age, there was only a small to moderate positive 
correlation between age and vulnerability. This suggests that decreases in subjective 
health do not necessarily lead to a perception of physical vulnerability indicating that 
moderating factors play a role in the relationship between health and vulnerability. 
Consequently, studies researching the relationship between health and fear of crime may 
profit from considering factors that influence this relationship. As mentioned in chapter 
2.2.2, physical vulnerability could be conceptualized as the perception of a discrepancy 
between what people assume is necessary to successfully deal with the environment and 
how people perceive their actual state in relation to these expectations. While they may 
realize that their actual physical state degrades, this may not be perceived to be discrepant 
with expectations about how to deal with the environment. This may be because the 
standards had been low all along or have been (unnoticed) adapted to a new standard in 
the sense of accommodative adaptations (e.g., Brandtstädter, 2009; Greve & Wentura, 
2010).  
The measure of physical vulnerability was found to be positively related with situational 
fear in regression analyses for each scenario. The more physical vulnerability was 
perceived, the more situational fear the participant reported. The effect of age on 
situational fear was partly mediated by differences in physical vulnerability. In scenarios 
where old adults indicated more situational fear than young adults, the age effect 
decreased after inclusion of vulnerability. In contrast, in scenarios where young adults 
indicated more fear, the age effect on situational fear even slightly increased, suggesting 
that other factors in age differences were attenuated by the opposing effect of physical 
vulnerability, which replicates the finding of Jackson (2009). Overall, this suggests that 
perceptions of physical vulnerability play a role in age differences of situational fear. In 
contrast to prior studies that included a measure of vulnerability (e.g., Hirtenlehner, 
2006b; Jackson, 2009), the measure of vulnerability in Study 2 did not directly pertain to 
crime-related perceptions of vulnerability but still obtained meaningful relations with 
situational fear of crime. This lends support for the importance of perceived physical 
vulnerability regarding fear of crime. 
On the other hand, physical vulnerability was not the only factor relevant in the evocation 
of situational fear as young adults indicated more fear than old adults in some scenarios. 
Moreover, while female participants indicated more situational fear in all but the market 
scenario, there was no gender-related difference in physical vulnerability. These findings 
suggest that differences in situational fear are also attributable to other factors than 
physical vulnerability. One explanation regarding gender effects in fear research that uses 
self-report measures concerns the reluctance of men to report fear (e.g., Goodey, 1997). 
In a series of experimental studies to test this explanation, Sutton and colleagues found 
that perceptions of masculinity play a role in reporting fear. In employing a social 
desirability scale, the authors could show that men’s affective fear of crime was 
underestimated (Sutton & Farrall, 2005). Moreover, when participants were instructed to 
answer the affective fear items according to their assumptions about typical men or 
women, men’s fear was downplayed, while women’s fear was reported to be even higher 
(Sutton, Robinson, & Farrall, 2011). The findings of a third study that distinguished 
between self-ascription of fear and ascription of fear to the average male and average 
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female participant corroborate the previous findings (Sutton & Farrall, 2008). 
Accordingly, gender differences in situational fear found in the present three studies and 
the lack of a relation with physical vulnerability may reveal that female participants were 
more willing to admit fear than male participants. On the other hand, the measure of 
physical vulnerability may not reflect gender-related differences in perception of 
vulnerability. A sense of vulnerability may not stem from the perception of physical 
inferiority but merely from believing that women in general are more likely to be the 
victim of crime or particularly the victim of rape. This knowledge, although it may not be 
accurate regarding most offense types, may alone create a sense of vulnerability. 
Applying this to the concept of vulnerability suggested previously, this would mean that 
people may have the perception that men are better able to deal with the environment 
successfully (without reflecting on the reasons for this). On the other hand, the person is 
either male or female. When being female, a discrepancy arises. This is not to say that all 
women and men perceive that discrepancy but rather that there need not be specific 
indicators of perceptions of physical vulnerability related to women to evoke more fear 
beyond the mere perception of being female. Moreover, the wording of the physical 
vulnerability items may not reflect specific gender-related perceptions of physical 
inferiority. 
However, this would not explain the occurrence and direction of age differences in 
situational fear. Other factors related to reporting fear such as script-congruent responding 
or experience with the situation were mentioned above. Another explanation consists in 
differences in the processing of the scenarios. Although there were no age group 
differences in the extent of the ability to relate to the stories, it is possible that older adults 
have unconsciously down-regulated the threatening impact of at least some vignettes “on-
line” (e.g., John & Gross, 2004; Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010). This could be due to the 
knowledge that preventive measures are already taken. Higher fear of young adults in the 
park and home scenarios and more fear of older adults in the car breakdown scenario lend 
support for this idea. The park and home vignettes describe scenarios, where a person can 
take preventive actions in order to avoid being in such a situation (i.e., not walking 
through the park at night or not having cash at home or at least have appropriate security 
devices). In contrast, the car breakdown scenario describes a scenario that can be less 
controlled and therefore less easily prevented. However, women also reported higher 
behavioral fear of crime but still have higher situational fear in almost every vignette 
scenario. Accordingly, the converse effect on situational fear of knowing that preventive 
measures are already taken does not seem to apply for women. Consequently, the 
employment of emotion regulation mechanisms could be an age-specific process in this 
case. 
A related finding in emotional developmental research refers to motivationally changed 
differences in emotion regulation (e.g., Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010). As mentioned 
above, the socioemotional selectivity theory assumes that old adults privilege the 
processing of positive stimuli compared to negative stimuli as part of emotion regulation 
due to a shortened life time perspective. This phenomenon is called ‘positivity effect’. 
Streubel and Kunzmann (2011) report positivity effects for moderately arousing stimuli, 
while they find no age-related differences with highly arousing stimuli in emotional 
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reactivity. Comparatively high fear intensity in the present studies constitutes a moderate 
intensity with regard to the scaling of the situational fear measure. More fear in young 
adults than in old adults in some scenarios may reflect emotion regulatory goals in 
processing. In order to test this assumption, regulation mechanisms should be 
manipulated both consciously and subconsciously. If this analysis should prove tenable, 
questions about the applicability of the vignette technique (or other emotion induction 
techniques) to test age differences in emotional reactivity arise. In section 3, I will present 
a technique that examines age group differences in a paradigm that supposedly measures 
automatic, i.e., uncontrolled, information processing. 
Reservations about the validity of the vignette scenarios in examining emotional 
reactivity are considerably weakened when considering the relation between vulnerability 
and situational fear (as described above) and the relation between situational fear and 
precautious behavior. Situational fear showed moderate to large correlations with the 
general measure of precautious behavior. This finding underlines the conceptual relation 
between the two measures (cf. Gabriel & Greve, 2003). Precautious behavior expresses 
underlying fear at least to some extent. Concerning the relationship between age and 
precautious behavior that was hypothesized to be mediated by situational fear (or rather 
an increase in dispositional fear), it could be shown that age-related increases in 
situational fear were indeed related to the age-related variance in precautious behavior. 
Accordingly, older adults who indicated more situational fear than young adults also took 
more precautious behaviors. However, a large part of the age-related variance was left 
unexplained by including situational fear. This could be explained by at least three 
accounts. First, as mentioned above, age-related increases in situational fear may not be 
captured adequately by the employed technique. Second, the measurement of precautious 
behavior itself may contain measurement errors. This aspect will be considered in the 
general discussion in chapter 5. Third, there may be other explanations for the increase in 
precautious behavior than the one focused on in this section. The findings regarding an 
age-related increase in importance of prevention indicate that other factors than the 
intensity of situational fear may be related to the age-related increase in precautious 
behavior. This approach will be given a closer look in section 4; other accounts will be 
discussed in the general discussion. 
 
Limitations Specific to Studies 1 to 3 
Besides alternative interpretations of the results as suggested above, additional limitations 
of the studies may restrict the conclusions drawn from the conducted studies. Limitations 
that are specific to Studies 1 to 3 are considered here, while more general limitations that 
pertain to all presented studies are discussed in the general discussion (chapter 5). 
In order to reach a more varied sample and achieve a larger sample size, an online study 
approach was employed in Study 3. While the female young and young middle-aged age 
groups were broadly represented in the online sample, other age groups were less easily 
accessible with this methodological approach. Particularly the oldest age group was 
underrepresented in the online sample, although attempts were made to recruit older 
adults at online platforms and computer clubs. However, this attempt was rather 
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unsuccessful. Given small sample sizes of older adults in the online approach, it is not 
possible to examine if the samples differed depending on online versus printed versions 
of the questionnaire. Older adults who are familiar with computers and the internet may 
still be the exception. In this sense, older adults who use a computer may be more open to 
new experiences and less anxious. This, again, could be confounded with the 
measurement approach of an online study that investigates fear. If older adults, who use 
the computer, were less afraid, this may underestimate the reported fear of crime in the 
study. Older adults of both measurement approaches were included as one sample. 
Because sample characteristics were comparable to previous studies as well as the 
findings concerning the componential measures of fear of crime were similar to other 
studies, it seems that the different methodological approaches did not impact on the 
findings to a large extent. 
Another limitation concerns the measurement of vulnerability. On the one hand, physical 
vulnerability covers only one dimension of vulnerability that may be relevant in fear of 
crime. As mentioned above with regard to gender, other aspects of vulnerability may be 
relevant as well such as perception of belonging to a certain group. It may also concern 
other dimensions of vulnerability such as financial vulnerability or social support. 
Moreover, although physical vulnerability was shown to be correlated with situational 
fear, correlations do not allow drawing conclusions about causal relations. Future studies 
would have to manipulate perceptions of physical vulnerability in order to strengthen the 
validity of findings. An experimental approach in this respect could consist in priming 
studies or conditioning studies that relate the self to perceptions of strength versus 
weakness in a similar way as, for example, Hannover (2000) evokes a collective versus 
individual identity in study participants.  
Furthermore, objections may arise regarding the use of the vignette technique as a 
measure to induce emotions. For example, demand effects may play a role in this kind of 
measurement. I tried to control this by varying the threat level within a certain scenario 
between subjects. Consequently, if subjects showed a difference due to threat level, this 
would be a response to threat instead of a general (demanded) response to the instruction 
to report what they feel. Particularly differences between threat levels in Study 3 suggest 
that participants responded to the threat level manipulation rather than to being instructed 
to report emotions. Another question concerns the intensity of felt emotions that can be 
induced with such a procedure. Westermann et al. (1996) report that film and vignette 
induction procedures with instructions show the largest effect sizes in inducing emotions 
(in comparison with, e.g., the Velten technique, music, gifts, or imitation of facial 
expressions). Participants were given the option to give comments at the end of the 
studies. Some of them reported that they felt very frightened. Moreover, for the studies’ 
question it would not be necessary to induce fear as intense as it may be felt if actually 
walking through a dark park if assuming that inter-individual differences would also be 
reflected in imagined dangerous situations. If there was a difference between the two, this 
could have consequences for the predictive validity.   
 
